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The Case for Sanctioning State Sponsors
of Genocide Incitement
Henry K. Kopel†
“Killing[,] . . . if you are adequately conditioned, . . . [y]ou do it without
shame . . . we were efficiently conditioned by radio broadcasts . . . .”
– Interview of Rwanda genocide participant1
“I believed the propaganda that all Jews were criminals and subhumans . . . .
[T]hat one should disobey or evade the order to participate in the extermina-
tion of the Jews did not therefore enter my mind at all.”
– Testimony of German Police Battalion member after World War II2
This Article recommends a policy designed to reduce the incidence of
genocide through legislation that would impose sanctions against state
sponsors of genocide incitement.  The goal of sanctioning state sponsors of
such incitement is to prevent genocides proactively, before the mass killing
starts.  Three prominent twentieth-century genocides— those of the Euro-
pean Jews, the Bosnian Muslims, and the Rwandan Tutsi— were all incited
by pervasive and deliberate campaigns of state-sponsored hate.  Most, if
not all, genocides are preceded by similar patterns of incitement.  Histori-
cal studies also show that most of the actual killers do not exhibit unusu-
ally violent propensities or psychological pathologies, but rather are
ordinary people from a cross-section of the population who have been
transformed into mass killers.  Several psychology experiments confirm
that the “perpetrator mindset” is easily triggered in ordinary people
through processes that involve dehumanization of the targeted groups.
Accordingly, mass hate incitement can create the large pool of perpetrators
who are necessary for a major genocide to occur.  For drafting incitement
sanctions legislation, the 1974 Jackson-Vanik trade sanctions law provides
a useful model.  A compelling target for such a statute is the prolific geno-
cide incitement of the present Iranian regime.  Statistical analyses of sanc-
tions policies yield success rates falling in a range of about one-third to
one-half of the pertinent cases studied, numbers which greatly exceed the
success rate of existing genocide prevention efforts.  As applied, the collat-
eral harms of incitement sanctions would be offset by the benefits of
† Henry K. Kopel is an Assistant United States Attorney in Connecticut; J.D. 1986,
University of Pennsylvania.  The views expressed in this Article are his own, and do not
reflect the views of the Justice Department.
1. Jean-Pierre Chre´tien, RTLM Propaganda: The Democratic Alibi, in THE MEDIA AND
THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 55, 55 (Allan Thompson ed., 2007).
2. DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS
AND THE HOLOCAUST 179 (1996) [hereinafter GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING
EXECUTIONERS].
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preventing both genocide and the regional geopolitical instability that often
follows in genocide’s wake.
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Introduction
Genocide has been aptly described as a “problem from hell.”3  It might
also be described as a hell of terrible persistence.  Since the Nazi Holocaust
of the 1940s— by no means the first genocide of the twentieth century—
genocides have been perpetrated, among other places, in Bangladesh
(1971), Burundi (1972), Cambodia (1975– 1979), Guatemala (1978– 83),
Iraqi Kurdistan (1987– 88), Bosnia (1992– 95), Rwanda (1994), and Sudan-
Darfur (2003– present).4  As one scholar concluded, the phrase “never
again”— a common refrain in remembrance of the Nazi Holocaust— has
come to mean little more than, “Never again will Germans kill Jews in
Europe in the 1940s.”5  This dispiriting history suggests that ending geno-
cide in the near future is, at best, a remote possibility.  However, this invites
the question of whether there presently exists any politically feasible policy
that could at least reduce the likelihood of future genocides.
This Article argues that such a policy does exist: one that is simple in
concept, consistent with existing legal norms, and targeted at one of the
major causal triggers of genocides and other mass killings.  This policy
would target state-sponsored genocide incitement by sanctioning and
defunding it.  Specifically, this policy will enjoin and inhibit such incite-
ment through federal legislation that conditions American military aid,
economic benefits, and bilateral trading rights upon each recipient coun-
try’s refraining from funding, facilitating, and encouraging incitement to
genocide.  The normative legal background for such a policy starts with
Article III(c) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, enacted by the United Nations on December 9, 1948,
which specifically criminalized “[d]irect and public incitement to commit
genocide.”6
Part I of this Article addresses the definitions of genocide and incite-
ment.  Part II examines three episodes of genocide in historical context,
3. See generally SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE (2002).
4. ADAM JONES, GENOCIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 142– 44 (2d ed. 2011)
(Guatemala); id. at 178 (Iraqi Kurdistan); id. at 293– 94 (Cambodia); id. at 320– 28 (Bos-
nia); id. at 340– 43 (Bangladesh); id. at 346 (Rwanda); id. at 365 n.27 (Burundi); id. at
371– 75 (Sudan-Darfur); cf. Barbara Harff, No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assess-
ing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 57,
59– 60 (2003) (documenting thirty-seven genocides occurring between 1955 and 2001).
5. David Rieff, The Persistence of Genocide, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://www.hoover.org/research/persistence-genocide.
6. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 3,
Dec. 9, 1948, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, S. Exec. Doc. O, 81-1 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S.
277, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2078/volume-78-I-1021-
English.pdf [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
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focusing on the pervasive media incitement promoted by the leaders
responsible for the genocides.  These episodes are the Nazi Holocaust of
the 1940s, the Bosnia genocide of 1992– 1995, and the Rwandan genocide
of 1994.  Part III discusses historical and social science research that indi-
cates a causal nexus between incitement and genocide.  Part IV discusses
the legislative sanctions and defunding policy proposal, and provides an
example of its possible application against the genocide incitement of the
present Iranian regime.  Finally, Part V outlines and weighs the implica-
tions, both positive and negative, regarding the proposed legislation.  This
Article concludes that the potential of the proposed legislation to reduce
the incidence of genocide incitement, and thereby to reduce the likelihood
of genocide in at least some circumstances, substantially outweighs the
negative policy outcomes that may result from its adoption.
I. Genocide and Incitement: Definitions
A. Defining Genocide
Under international law, the prevailing definition of genocide is set
forth in Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, enacted by the United Nations on December 9,
1948 (hereinafter, “UN Genocide Convention”):
[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.7
The United States Code’s criminal genocide statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1091, uses
a virtually identical definition.8
Both before and since the adoption of the UN Genocide Convention,
the proper scope of Article II’s definitional coverage has been subject to
debate, specifically in regard to whether entities in addition to “national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group[s]” are, or should be, included in its pro-
tections.9  Among groups not listed within Article II’s definition are those
defined by political, cultural, economic, or gender characteristics— all
7. Id.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2009).
9. JONES, supra note 4, at 34 (“Huge controversy has attended the Genocide Con-
vention’s exclusion of all but . . . national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups . . . [on
the] list of protected groups.”); STEPHEN R. RATNER, JASON S. ABRAMS & JAMES L. BISCHOFF,
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE
NUREMBERG LEGACY 36 (3d ed., 2009) [hereinafter RATNER ET AL.]; Beth Van Schaack, The
Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J.
2259, 2263– 69 (1997) (detailing debates and compromises underlying the UN’s deci-
sion to exclude political groups from coverage).
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groups which have been targets of mass slaughter, mass sexual assault, or
other genocide-type harms over the past century.10  In addition, Article II’s
definitional coverage is ambiguous regarding mass atrocities within groups,
perpetrated by group members against their own.  This ambiguity stems
from the interpretation of the phrase, “intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a . . . group.”11  For instance, a strict construction of the definition might
preclude the UN Genocide Convention’s jurisdiction over the Khmer
Rouge’s slaughter of more than 1.5 million Cambodians in the 1970s, inso-
far as the Khmer perpetrators shared the same national, ethnic, racial, and
religious affiliations of most of their victims.12
Contemporary debates over the UN Genocide Convention’s narrow
definitional scope tend to cluster around one of three positions: (1) Article
II of the UN Genocide Convention should be amended to include a broader
definition of groups targeted for genocidal harms;13 (2) a formal amend-
ment is not needed because a more inclusive meaning of the word “group”
in Article II is already supported by pertinent interpretive sources of inter-
national law;14 and/or (3) expanding Article II’s definition of “group”—
whether by legislation or judicial interpretation— is not necessary because
the infliction of genocide-type harms upon non-covered groups is sepa-
rately proscribed by international laws governing crimes against
humanity.15
This Article does not seek to resolve these competing positions.
Instead, this Article’s central concern is a legislative proposal both jurisdic-
tionally and functionally distinct from the UN Genocide Convention.  The
proposed legislation is not international, but particular to a single nation-
10. See JONES, supra note 4, at 28 (referencing Latin American countries’ “politi-
cides” of suspected communists in the 1970s and 1980s); id. at 191– 94 (describing
Stalin’s mass deportations and starvation of millions of “Kulaks” during forced collectiv-
ization of Ukrainian agriculture); id. at 464– 73 (listing “gendercides,” viz., mass killings
of men and mass rapes of women).
11. Genocide Convention art. 2, supra note 6 (emphasis added).
12. RATNER ET AL., supra note 9, at 322; Van Schaack, supra note 9, at 2261 (“[A]
close reading of the Genocide Convention leads to . . . [the] conclusion [that] . . . it does
not cover a significant portion of the deaths in Cambodia.”); id. at 2271– 72.
13. RATNER ET AL., supra note 9, at 46 (“[I]t is long overdue for the law of genocide to
evolve beyond its 1940s roots . . . to encompass the mass destruction of any human
collective based on any core element of human identity . . . .”); cf. JONES, supra note 4, at
24– 29 (endorsing broader definition of covered groups, and listing fifteen target/victim
groups recommended for inclusion by genocide scholars).
14. JONES, supra note 4, at 14 (noting the position taken by the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda, that “any stable and permanent group” is entitled to protection
under the UN Genocide Convention); Van Schaack, supra note 9, at 2261– 62 (arguing
that broader definition of protected groups is effectively incorporated in UN Genocide
Convention by the international law principle of “jus cogens,” viz., “customary and per-
emptory norm[s] of international law from which no derogation is permitted”).
15. JONES, supra note 4, at 25 (“[A]t the level of international law, genocide is per-
haps being displaced by the framing of ‘crimes against humanity,’ which is easier to
prosecute and imposes much the same punishments as for genocide convictions.”);
RATNER ET AL., supra note 9, at 51 (noting that atrocities in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, and Cambodia all were prosecuted under rubric of crimes against
humanity).
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state; and its principal function is the proactive prevention of genocide, not
after-the-fact prosecution.  It nonetheless bears noting that all three posi-
tions reflect a growing consensus that the proscription and criminalization
of genocide-type harms should include a broader array of protected groups
than those presently covered by the UN Genocide Convention.
Accordingly, and mindful of the proposed legislation’s purpose, this
Article will employ a broad and inclusive definition of genocide.  Specifi-
cally, genocide will be defined as any of the above-listed genocidal acts of
sub-sections II(a) through (e) of the UN Genocide Convention, when com-
mitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a “national, ethnic, racial,
religious, political, social, gender[, cultural,] or economic group,” including
such acts perpetrated within groups.16
Viewed against the UN Genocide Convention’s drafting history, this
definition and incorporation of a more expansive range of protected groups
appears less as a new departure than a return to early aspirations.  In
1947, the UN General Assembly initiated the drafting process by passing
Resolution 96(I), which defined genocide as “a denial of the right of exis-
tence of entire human groups” and declared it a crime “whether . . . com-
mitted on religious, racial, political, or any other grounds . . . .”17  Later, an
early draft of the genocide convention proposed to include “racial,
national, linguistic, religious, or political groups . . . .”18  Only in the
enacted version of the UN Genocide Convention was the list significantly
scaled back.19
B. Defining Genocide Incitement
In international law, three critical events over the last seventy years
exemplify and define the concept of genocide incitement.  These events
include firstly, the post-World War II Nuremberg prosecutions of German
Nazi war criminals in 1945– 1946, which conferred legal recognition on
the concept of genocide incitement; secondly, the codification of the crime
of genocide incitement in the 1948 UN Genocide Convention; and finally,
after a decades-long hiatus of legal developments, the prosecutions com-
menced by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the late
16. JONES, supra note 4, at 13, 18.
17. Van Schaack, supra note 9, at 2263 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 2264.
19. Excluding political groups from the enacted version received especially strong
criticism. See JONES, supra note 4, at 14– 15 (“[T]he exclusion of political groups . . . [i]n
the estimation of many genocide scholars . . . is the Convention’s greatest oversight.”).
Transcripts from debates over the UN Genocide Convention reveal several articulated
reasons for excluding political groups, including: the lack of “homogeneity” and “stabil-
ity” of other included groups; the belief that political groups were deemed less vulnera-
ble than the included groups; that including political groups would constrain domestic
efforts to deter and prosecute violent “subversive” groups; that the Soviet Union and
others would object to constraints on domestic sovereignty by international protections
for political groups; and finally, excluding political groups was a quid pro quo for includ-
ing language authorizing international tribunals to prosecute genocide crimes. See
JONES, supra note 4, at 14– 15; POWER, supra note 3, at 68– 69, 531 n.13– 14; RATNER ET
AL., supra note 9, at 36; Van Schaack, supra note 9, at 2264– 68.
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1990s, which imposed criminal liability for media-based genocide
incitement.
1. The Nuremberg Tribunal
In the 1945– 1946 Nuremberg prosecutions, two of the twenty-four
defendants— Julius Streicher and Hans Fritzsche— were charged with
crimes against humanity based exclusively on their work directing and pro-
ducing print and radio propaganda for the Nazi regime.  Streicher was con-
victed and sentenced to death; Fritzsche was acquitted.20  The judgment of
the Nuremberg Tribunal characterized Streicher’s activities as “incitement
to murder and extermination.”21  From 1923 to 1945 Streicher published
Der Sturmer, an anti-Semitic weekly newspaper, which by 1935 had a cir-
culation of 600,000.  The judgment found that:
For his twenty-five years of speaking, writing, and preaching hatred of the
Jews, Streicher was widely known as “Jew-Baiter Number One.”  In his
speeches and articles, week after week, month after month, he infected the
German mind with the virus of anti-Semitism and incited the German peo-
ple to active persecution.22
The judgment also noted that from 1938, Streicher “began to call for the
annihilation of the Jewish race,” with numerous articles in Der Sturmer
preaching “extermination ‘root and branch.’”23  It is evident from the judg-
ment that Streicher played no personal role in killing Jews or other Nazi
victims, in administering any concentration camps or other killing opera-
tions, or in any of the policy decisions of the Nazi regime.  The judgment,
however, emphasized that it was “[w]ith knowledge of the extermination of
the Jews” that Streicher “continued to write and publish his propaganda of
death.”24
By contrast, in assessing Hans Fritzsche’s roles as a Nazi radio com-
mentator and propaganda ministry official, the Nuremberg Tribunal noted
that despite Fritzsche’s anti-Semitic speeches, he “did not urge persecution
or extermination of Jews.”  Furthermore, the tribunal found “no evidence
that he was aware of their extermination in the East,” and also that Fritz-
sche “twice attempted to have publication of the anti-Semitic Der Sturmer
suppressed, though unsuccessfully.”25
20. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1: Indictment, THE AVALON PROJECT (2008)
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count.asp; Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1, Indict-
ment: Appendix, THE AVALON PROJECT (2008), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/counta.
asp; Judgement: Streicher, THE AVALON PROJECT (2008), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/
judstrei.asp; Judgement: Fritzsche, THE AVALON PROJECT (2008), http://avalon.law.yale.
edu/imt/judfritz.asp; see also Incitement to Genocide in International Law, in UNITED
STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?Mod
uleId=10007839 (last updated Jan. 29, 2016).
21. Judgement: Streicher, supra note 20.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Judgement: Fritzsche, supra note 20.
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2. The UN Genocide Convention
In 1948— only two years after the Nuremberg Judgment— the United
Nations adopted the UN Genocide Convention.  The law’s passage was
largely due to an extraordinary lobbying campaign waged by Raphael
Lemkin, a Polish– Jewish e´migre´ and legal scholar who had lost forty-nine
family members in the Holocaust.26
As noted above, Article II of the UN Genocide Convention established
a definition of genocide.27  Article III then imposed criminal liability for
any of the following five acts:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.28
The UN Genocide Convention did not include a definition of “[d]irect and
public incitement to commit genocide,” and no further prosecutions
involving genocide incitement nor any possible interpretive case law on the
subject occurred until the late 1990s.
3. The Rwanda Genocide Prosecutions
The elements of genocide incitement were elaborated at considerable
length by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) during
the early 1990s.  The ICTR was established by a resolution of the United
Nations Security Council following the 1994 Rwandan genocide.29
Between April and July 1994, leaders of Rwanda’s majority Hutu popula-
tion, having recruited and armed several groups of Hutu militias,
unleashed a mass killing of at least 800,000 members of the minority Tutsi
population.  Many of the killings were committed by hand-to-hand attacks
with machetes and similar tools.30  Before and during the genocide,
Rwanda’s leading radio station, Radio Te´le´vision Libre des Mille Collines
(RTLM), and one of the leading newspapers, Kangura, issued a nearly con-
stant deluge of hate propaganda directed against the Tutsi minority, fre-
quently calling for their extermination.31
The ICTR brought multiple prosecutions for media-based genocide
incitement.  The subject received its most extensive treatment in the
December 2003 trial judgment of the joint prosecution of three defendants,
26. POWER, supra note 3, at 47– 60.  It was Lemkin who created the word “genocide,”
which first appeared in his 1944 book: Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Id. at 38– 43.
27. G.A. Res. 260(III)A, Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Dec.
9, 1948), http://www.un-documents.net/a3r260.htm.
28. G.A. Res. 260(III)A, supra note 27, art. 3.
29. S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994), http://daccessods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&
DS=S/RES/955%20(1994)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC.  Article II of the Annex to S.C. Res.
955 incorporated the text of the UN Genocide Convention, including its proscription of
“[d]irect and public incitement to commit genocide.” Id. at 3– 4.
30. JONES, supra note 4, at 352, 358; see LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE
RWANDAN GENOCIDE 56, 250– 51 (2004); see also discussion infra Section II.C.
31. MELVERN, supra note 30, at 49– 56, 208– 09.
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Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze.32
Defendants Nahimana and Barayagwiza were among the founders and
directors of RTLM radio, and defendant Ngeze was the founder and Editor-
in-Chief of the newspaper Kangura.33  The ICTR found all three guilty of
direct and public incitement to commit genocide.34
In discussing the elements of genocide incitement, the ICTR’s trial
judgment in Prosecutor v. Nahimana included the following definitions:
“[I]ncitement” . . . is defined as encouragement or provocation to commit an
offence.  “[P]ublic” incitement [i]s “a call for criminal action to a number of
individuals in a public place or to members of the general public at large by
such means as the mass media, for example, radio or television.”35
The ICTR further identified the elements of the crime of incitement by
focusing particularly on the purpose of the communications in question, as
determined both from the text of the communications in question, and
from the surrounding context in which the communications are
delivered.36
The ICTR used the terms “purpose” and “intent” interchangeably: “the
importance of intent, that is the purpose of the communications . . .
emerges from the jurisprudence [on incitement].”37  In a genocide incite-
ment case, the purpose that must be proved is “the intent to directly
prompt or provoke another to commit genocide,” demonstrating “a desire
on the part of the perpetrator to create by his actions a particular state of
mind necessary to commit such a crime in the minds of the person(s) he is
so engaging.”38  Thus “the person who is inciting to commit genocide must
have himself the specific intent to commit genocide.”39
The text of a statement is one of the two primary determinants of
genocidal intent.  In scrutinizing a statement’s text for evidence of intent,
the ICTR drew a distinction between, on the one hand, news reports about
both calls for violence and ethnic hatreds intended “to convey informa-
tion,” and on the other hand, statements that endorse violence and
32. See generally Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and
Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003), http://www.refworld.org/docid/404468bc2.html.  The ICTR
noted in the judgment it had “first considered the elements of . . . incitement to commit
genocide in the prior case of [Prosecutor v.] Akayesu,” but distinguished the incitement
in Akayesu as limited to the defendant’s own spoken words, whereas Nahimana and his
co-defendants “used the print and radio media systematically . . . for the mobilization of
the population on a grand scale.” Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T at 325 (paras.
978– 79).  The Nahimana judgment included a much more comprehensive discussion of
the elements and findings on genocide incitement than did the Akayesu judgment, spe-
cifically, nineteen pages versus five pages.
33. Case No. ICTR-99-52-T at 1– 2 (paras. 5– 9), 166– 95 (paras. 491– 92, 495,
506– 07, 571).
34. Id. at 356– 57 (paras. 1092– 94).
35. Id. at 337 (para. 1011) (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T
(Sept. 2, 1998)).
36. Id. at 334– 35, 337– 38, 340– 41 (paras. 1001, 1004, 1012, 1020– 24).
37. Id. at 334 (para. 1001).
38. Id. at 337– 38 (para. 1012).
39. Id. at 337– 38 (para. 1012).
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“promot[e] ethnic hatred.”40  Both the accuracy and tone of a statement are
relevant in making that distinction.  “[T]he inaccuracy of the statement
might . . . indicat[e] that the intent . . . was not to convey information but
rather to promote . . . resentment and inflame ethnic tensions.”41  “The
tone of the statement is as relevant to this determination as is its con-
tent . . . .”42  For example, a statement will be deemed to “constitut[e] eth-
nic hatred” where it expresses “stereotyping of ethnicity combined with its
denigration.”43
The second primary determinant of intent is the context in which a
statement is made.  Specifically, whether, and to what extent, there exists a
genocidal environment that is likely to lead to violence:
A statement of ethnic generalization provoking resentment against members
of that ethnicity would have a heightened impact in the context of a genoci-
dal environment.  It would be more likely to lead to violence.  At the same
time the environment would be an indicator that incitement to violence was
the intent of the statement.44
In this same judgment, the ICTR further clarified its definition by list-
ing two elements that are not needed to prove genocide incitement.  First,
the ICTR held that there need not be proof of a causal link between the
statements in question and acts of genocide: a “causal relationship is not
requisite to a finding of incitement.  It is the potential of the communica-
tion to cause genocide that makes it incitement.”45  Second, there need not
be an actual occurrence of genocide to find liability for genocide incite-
ment.  Like the crime of conspiracy, “incitement to commit geno-
cide . . . [is] an inchoate offence,” and hence
can be punished even where such incitement was unsuccessful . . . .
“[G]enocide clearly falls within the category of crimes so serious that direct
and public incitement to commit such a crime must be punished as such,
even where such incitement failed to produce the result expected by the
perpetrator.”46
However, as noted above, regarding the evidentiary significance of a genoci-
dal environment, the occurrence of genocidal acts may serve as evidence
that the communications in question were intended to promote genocidal
violence.
Synthesizing the foregoing elements and considerations, one can for-
mulate a working definition of direct and public incitement to genocide as
follows:
1) Communications,
2) Conveyed to a large number of individuals
40. Id. at 339– 41 (paras. 1020, 1024).
41. Id. at 340 (para. 1021).
42. Id. at 340 (para. 1022).
43. Id. at 339 (para. 1021) (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 340 (para. 1022).
45. Id. at 338 (para. 1015) (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 338 (para. 1013) (quoting Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T
(Sept. 2, 1998)).
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a. Either gathered physically in a public place,
b. Or accessed in dispersed locations through mass media,
3) Intending to promote genocide (defined in section I.A, above),
4) As evidenced primarily by their text and context:
a. Text that endorses hatred and/or violence towards one or more
groups,
b. In a context where such communications are likely to lead to violence
against the targeted group(s),
5) Irrespective of whether a causal link is shown between the communica-
tions and any genocidal acts, and irrespective of whether any genocidal
acts occur.
II. Historical Cases
Genocide has occurred throughout recorded human history.47  Mod-
ern manifestations of genocide and its accompanying incitement are dis-
tinguished by, among other things, the availability of mass media and
communications technology.  Focusing on the latter, this Part draws from
the twentieth century to examine three prominent episodes of genocide
and corresponding incitement: the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews
(1941– 1945), the Serb genocide of the Bosnian Muslims (1992– 1995), and
the Rwandan Hutu genocide of the Rwandan Tutsi (1994).  Each case study
first summarizes the historical context and subsequent conduct of the
genocide in question, then describes in some detail the state-sponsored,
“eliminationist” incitement that preceded the genocide.48
A. The Nazi Holocaust of the Jews (1941– 1945)
1. Context and Conduct of the Genocide
In the 1930s, Germany had a Jewish population of 535,000, about one
percent of its population of over fifty million.49  Over the past century,
German– Jewish people had been “emancipated,” that is, granted citizen-
ship rights,50 but the often bitter emancipation debates had unleashed a
backlash of anti-Semitism.51  After Germany’s 1918 defeat in World War I,
a cascade of events destabilized Germany’s postwar Weimar Republic,
which further exacerbated resentments towards Jewish people and other
scapegoats.52  The Republic’s legitimacy was undermined from the start by
the false claim that, but for a “stab in the back” by civilians who had signed
47. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 4, at 5– 8; STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR
NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 332– 33 (2014).
48. As defined by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, eliminationism is “the desire to eliminate
peoples or groups,” (emphasis in original) which can involve “extermination,” but also
“destruction of . . . group[ ] identities, [physical] expulsion, [and] prevention of repro-
duction . . . .” DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, WORSE THAN WAR: GENOCIDE, ELIMINATIONISM,
AND THE ONGOING ASSAULT ON HUMANITY 14 (2009) [hereinafter GOLDHAGEN, WORSE
THAN WAR].
49. MICHAEL BURLEIGH, THE THIRD REICH: A NEW HISTORY 94, 315 (2000); SAUL FRIED-
LANDER, NAZI GERMANY AND THE JEWS, ABRIDGED EDITION 4 (2009).
50. GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 2, at 55– 57.
51. Id. at 56– 62.
52. See id. at 82– 83.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-2\CIN204.txt unknown Seq: 12 10-OCT-16 14:50
426 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 49
the 1918 armistice and 1919 Versailles Treaty, Germany would have won
the war.53  The Republic was further besieged by several regional revolts
and political assassinations.54
Then in 1922– 1923, Germany defaulted on reparations payments due
under the Versailles Treaty, and a Franco– Belgian army occupied Ger-
many’s industrial heartland.  German resistance and Franco– Belgian
financial extractions culminated in a wave of hyperinflation that wiped out
the assets and savings of the German middle class.55  International loans
helped restore stability, but public opinion was left simmering with resent-
ments against Jewish people and others.56
From the early 1920s, Adolph Hitler’s Nazi party channeled and
amplified these popular resentments with devastating political effective-
ness.57  Promising to undo Versailles, restore German power, and punish
Germany’s enemies, the Nazi party seized power in March 1933 despite
lacking a majority of seats in the Reichstag.58  The Nazis immediately
launched an escalating series of anti-Jewish policies.  The following serves
as a cursory summary of their pathway to genocide.
In 1933, the Nazis declared a boycott of Jewish businesses and passed
laws barring Jewish people from working in farming, medicine, the law,
and the civil service.59  The 1935 Nuremberg laws stripped Jewish people
of German citizenship, and barred marriage and sexual contact with
Germans.60  Between 1933 and 1938, Nazi “Aryanization” campaigns
forced the sale of virtually all Jewish businesses to Germans at fire sale
prices, leaving their former owners impoverished.61
In November 1938, when a Jewish person murdered a German
embassy official in Paris, the Nazis launched a nation-wide pogrom known
as “Kristallnacht” (“The night of broken glass”).  Nazis destroyed over 260
synagogues and over 7,000 Jewish businesses, and murdered ninety-one
Jewish people; mobs across Germany beat up thousands more.62  The
Nazis fined the dwindling Jewish community one billion Reichmarks for
the embassy murder, and seized all Jewish victims’ insurance payments.63
53. BURLEIGH, supra note 49, at 33, 49– 51.
54. Id. at 52– 53, 58– 59.
55. Id. at 54– 57.
56. GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 2, at 82 (amidst the
privations of the early Weimer years, “government reports from around Germany . . .
portray[ed] a virulent hatred of Jews”).
57. See IAN KERSHAW, HITLER: A BIOGRAPHY 62– 64, 89 (2008).
58. Id. at 202– 03, 241– 42, 253– 56; BURLEIGH, supra note 49, at 144– 53.
59. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 49, at 7– 15; PHYLLIS GOLDSTEIN, A CONVENIENT HATRED:
THE HISTORY OF ANTISEMITISM 266– 68 (2011).  Initially these laws were only partially
enforced, but became fully effective by the late 1930s. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 49, at 13,
50.
60. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 49, at 45– 46, 49– 50.  Also in November 1935, all Jewish
professors, teachers, attorneys, and notaries employed by the Reich were ordered dis-
missed. Id. at 50.
61. Id. at 84– 85, 118; BURLEIGH, supra note 49, at 309– 314.
62. BURLEIGH, supra note 49, at 323– 27; FRIEDLANDER, supra note 49, at 111– 16.
63. BURLEIGH, supra note 49, at 334; FRIEDLANDER, supra at note 49, 118.
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The Nazi invasion of western Poland in 1939 and of Eastern Europe
and Russia in 1941 placed millions of Jewish people under Nazi rule.  In
Poland, the Nazis herded Jewish people into “ghettos,” walled-off city
blocks packed with several Jewish people per room; many died of starva-
tion or disease.64  Mass killings escalated in 1941 as the Nazis stormed
eastern Poland, Ukraine, the Baltics, and western Russia.  Nazi “Einsatz-
gruppen” and police battalions— killing squads assigned to follow the Ger-
man army’s front lines— hunted down and murdered up to two million
Jewish people between 1941 and 1945.  Entire Jewish communities num-
bering in the thousands were rounded up, forced to dig enormous death
pits, then lined up and machine-gunned en masse.65
In 1941/1942 the Nazis commenced mass killing of Europe’s Jewish
people in gas chambers at several death camps across Central Europe: two
million died at Chelmno, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, and Auschwitz-Birke-
nau.66  Still more perished in the Nazis’ slave labor camps.67  In 1944/
1945, as allied armies surged across Germany’s borders, the Nazis rushed
thousands of barely-surviving Jewish people out of the camps on death
marches: trudging hundreds of miles in snow without shoes, barely clothed
or fed, “sleeping” on frozen ground, and beaten frequently.68
Two pertinent observations by Holocaust scholars warrant mention
here.  The first observation is the extreme cruelty that Nazis inflicted on
Jews before they were murdered.  For example, during the invasion of
Poland, German soldiers took sadistic pleasure in tormenting Orthodox
Jewish people:
[T]hey were compelled to smear feces on one another . . . [to] clean excre-
ment with prayer shawls, and dance around . . . burning Torah scrolls.  They
were whipped, forced to eat pork, or had Jewish stars carved on their fore-
heads. . . .  Beards and sidelocks were . . . set afire [or] hacked off with or
without parts of skin, cheeks, or jaws, to the amusement of a usually large
audience of cheering soldiers.69
Even in a very rare case where supervisory officials directed the guards not
to harm the Jewish people further— as at the start of the death marches—
the guards continued to torment, starve, and beat the helpless Jews
remorselessly.70
64. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 49, at 160– 61, 205– 10; GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING
EXECUTIONERS, supra note 2, at 145, 289. The Warsaw ghetto had a population density
of more than nine Jews per room. GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra
note 2, at 289.
65. BURLEIGH, supra note 49, at 628– 29; GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTION-
ERS, supra note 2, at 154, 228– 30.
66. BURLEIGH, supra note 49, at 636, 643– 44, 650; GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING
EXECUTIONERS, supra note 2, at 157, 173; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 59, at 277– 79.
67. GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 2, at 293– 302, 312;
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 59, at 277.
68. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 49, at 417; GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS,
supra note 2, at 328– 30, 334, 347– 51.
69. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 49, at 154.
70. GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 2, at 356– 57.  This unu-
sual order, issued by the Nazi leader Heinrich Himmler, had nothing to do with compas-
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The second observation is the sheer number of individuals needed to
carry out the vast array of tasks involved in planning and implementing
such large-scale mass killings.  The Nazi regime established more than
20,000 camps and ghettos to conduct the Holocaust.71  Goldhagen esti-
mates that at least 100,000, and possibly more than 500,000 people were
needed to staff all the work camps, death camps, Einsatzgruppen, police
battalions, and ghetto administrations.72
2. The Nazis’ Eliminationist Incitement
In 1920s Germany, “virtually every major institution and group . . .
was permeated by anti-Semitism.”73  A product of his times, the Nazi leader
Adolf Hitler declared at a 1920 party meeting the need to “attack the evil
[of Jewry] . . . and to exterminate it root and branch.”74
Hitler’s early speeches and 1925 testament Mein Kampf (“My Strug-
gle”) propagated the genocidal ideology that the Nazi regime later carried
out.75  This ideology identified “world Jewry” as a nefarious force that con-
trolled both Soviet Bolshevism and “rapacious” Western capitalism— both
deemed mortal threats to Germany and the Aryan race.76  Nazi party meet-
ings advertised titles like “The Jews as the enemy of man.”77  Nazi leader
Joseph Goebbels denounced his country’s role as “an exploitation colony
of International Jewry[‘s] . . . murderous economic war” against Ger-
many.78  As Nazis gained votes in the early 1930s, anti-Jewish incitement
proliferated.79  Nazi agitators denounced the Jewish people as “a murder-
ous plague” which it was “our duty to exterminate,” and called for “cleans-
ing . . . the body politic from [Jewish] vermin.”80
On taking power in 1933, the Nazis promptly seized control of the
media.  In October 1933 all German newspapers were placed under the
direction of Joseph Goebbels’s propaganda ministry.81  Throughout his
rule, Hitler met almost daily with Reich press chief Otto Dietrich, resulting
in the press office’s issuing over 75,000 directives to thousands of German
sion, but with Himmler’s concern to avoid harsher terms for Germany’s possible
surrender in attempted negotiations with American officials. Id.
71. 1 THE UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CAMPS AND
GHETTOS, 1933– 1945, at xxix (2009).
72. See GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 2, at 166– 68 (“[T]he
number who became perpetrators of the Holocaust . . . was certainly over one hundred
thousand.  It would not be surprising if the number turned out to be five hundred thou-
sand or more.”).
73. Id. at 82.
74. JEFFREY HERF, THE JEWISH ENEMY: NAZI PROPAGANDA DURING WORLD WAR II AND
THE HOLOCAUST 3 (2006).
75. Id. at 3.
76. Id. at 92, 148– 50; BURLEIGH, supra note 49, at 91; HERF, supra note 74, at 37.
77. C.C. ARONSFELD, THE TEXT OF THE HOLOCAUST: A STUDY OF THE NAZIS EXTERMINA-
TION PROPAGANDA, 1919– 1945, at 7 (1985).
78. HERF, supra note 74, at 37.
79. ARONSFELD, supra note 77, at 14.
80. Id. at 14, 17.
81. See id. at 18– 22.
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news outlets between 1933 and 1945.82
The subsequent onslaught of state-sponsored Jew-hatred across Ger-
many was unprecedented in history; only representative examples can be
cited here.  The Nazis held mass rallies in Nuremberg before cheering
crowds— replayed in weekly newsreels— where Hitler denounced Jewish
people as “Bolsheviks” and “parasitic world intellectuals.”83  In 1933,
Hitler called for a boycott of Jewish businesses, and the Nazis blanketed the
streets with posters declaring the Jews “the enemy of the German peo-
ple.”84  In 1934, Julius Streicher’s Der Sturmer newspaper devoted an
entire issue to “ritual murder,” which claimed that Jewish people abducted
and murdered Christian children to use their blood in religious rituals.85
In German schools, “teachers denounced all the Jews, without exception,
as . . . the most destructive force in every country where they were living.”86
Schools were directed to teach “[t]he Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” a
pamphlet falsely describing a secret Jewish plan to take over the world.87
As Hitler prepared to invade Poland, Nazi propaganda preemptively
accused “world Jewry” of instigating the coming war, and promised to
exterminate them for doing so.  Speaking in January 1939, Hitler blamed
the Jewish people for World War I and Germany’s economic collapse,
pledging that “if international finance Jewry should succeed in plunging
the nations once more into a world war, the result will be . . . the annihila-
tion of the Jewish race in Europe.”88
A year later, after the invasion of Poland started World War II, Hitler
declared that “[t]he Jewish-capitalist world enemy . . . has only one goal: to
exterminate Germany and the German people.”89  In 1940 the Nazis
released anti-Semitic propaganda films showing Jews seducing German
maidens, profiting from Germans’ miseries, and superimposing images of
Jewish “hordes” with swarms of sewer rats.90  By 1941, the Nazi propa-
ganda apparatus was posting 125,000 outdoor wall newspapers across Ger-
many every week, many of them attacking the Jewish people: the July 23
and July 30, 1941 issues denounced “Jewish-Bolsheviks” for “horrible
atrocities” alongside photos of corpses.91  In July 1941, a Goebbels edito-
rial announced “[t]he Jews are guilty!” and praised “the fist of an awakened
Germany” for having “slammed down on this racial rubbish . . . .”  Hitler
kept repeating his genocidal 1939 pledge, declaring “[t]he struggle will . . .
end . . . with the extermination of Jewry in Europe.”92
82. HERF, supra note 74, at 24– 25.
83. HERF, supra note 74, at 42– 43.
84. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 59, at 266.
85. ARONSFELD, supra note 77, at 26; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 59, at 83– 85.
86. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 59, at 267.
87. NORMAN COHN, WARRANT FOR GENOCIDE: THE MYTH OF THE JEWISH WORLD CON-
SPIRACY AND THE PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION 221– 22 (2005).
88. HERF, supra note 74, at 52.
89. Id. at 64.
90. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 49, at 187– 89.
91. Id. at 102.
92. ARONSFELD, supra note 77, at 35– 36.
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In 1942, a German– Jewish diarist wrote, “[F]or nearly ten years the
inferiority and harmfulness of the Jews has been emphasized in every
newspaper, . . . every radio broadcast and on many posters, . . . without a
voice in favor of the Jews being . . . permitted to be raised.”93  During the
war years, the “daily experience of all Germans included . . . radical anti-
Semitic propaganda whose unambiguous intent was to justify mass murder
of Jews.”94
B. The Serbian Genocide of the Bosnian Muslims (1992– 1995)
1. Context and Conduct of the Genocide
In 1992, on the eve of genocide, Bosnia’s religious/ethnic population
was forty-four percent Muslim, thirty-one percent Eastern Orthodox Serb,
and seventeen percent Catholic Croat.95  Those numbers were a legacy of
the Roman and Ottoman empires.  In 395 C.E., when the Roman Empire
split into eastern and western halves, the boundary left what later became
Serbia in the East, Croatia in the West, and Bosnia in the middle.96  The
East/West schism of the medieval Church mirrored this split, leaving Ser-
bia Eastern Orthodox and Croatia Roman Catholic, with Bosnia home to
both faiths.97
In the fourteenth century, the Ottoman Muslims conquered southeast-
ern Europe, including Serbia.98  Muslim law deemed Christians second-
class “dhimmis” subject to punitive taxes, economic barriers, and limited
religious rights, with every fifth Christian child conscripted as a slave to
serve the empire.99  Despite this, the region experienced minimal ethnic
conflict until the nineteenth century.100  Amidst a rising nationalist tide,
Serbia won independence in 1878.  The Serbs then forced all Muslims
within their borders to leave or convert to Christianity.101
After World War I, the peace conferees combined Serbia, Croatia, and
Slovenia into a new, Serb-dominated nation of Yugoslavia.102  During
World War II, the Axis armies installed fascist regimes in Serbia and Croa-
93. GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 2, at 449.
94. HERF, supra note 74, at 12.
95. Push for national census reveals scars of Bosnia’s painful past, PBS NEWSHOUR
(Oct. 10, 2013) (transcript), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world-july-dec13-bosnia
_10-10/.
96. Stephen Schwartz, Beyond “Ancient Hatreds”: What Really Happened to Yugosla-
via, POL’Y REV. (Oct. 1, 1999), http://www.hoover.org/research/persistence-genocide.
97. NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE: A HISTORY 18, 239, 246, 380 (1998); BEN KIERNAN,
BLOOD AND SOIL: A WORLD HISTORY OF GENOCIDE AND EXTERMINATION FROM SPARTA TO
DARFUR 588 (2007); ANTHONY PAGDEN, WORLDS AT WAR: THE 2,500-YEAR STRUGGLE
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST 142– 43, 254– 55 (2009).
98. See PAGDEN, supra note 97, at 252– 53, 256– 57; DAVIES, supra note 97, at 386,
388– 89.
99. EFRIAM KARSH, ISLAMIC IMPERIALISM: A HISTORY 25– 26 (2006); BAT YE’OR, ISLAM
AND DHIMMITUDE: WHERE CIVILIZATIONS COLLIDE 50– 52, 56– 59, 62 (2002).
100. MARK MAZOWER, THE BALKANS: A SHORT HISTORY, at xlii– xliii, 58– 64 (2002).
101. NORMAN CIGAR, GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA: THE POLICY OF “ETHNIC CLEANSING” 16– 17
(1995); DAVIES, supra note 97, at 834; MAZOWER, supra note 100, at 79.
102. CIGAR, supra note 101, at 17– 18; WARREN ZIMMERMANN, ORIGINS OF A CATASTRO-
PHE 5 (1999).
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tia, both of which commenced ethnic cleansing.103  After the war, Yugosla-
via returned under the rule of independent Communist leader Joseph Tito,
whose strict rule suppressed ethnic conflict.104  After Tito died in 1980
separatist movements re-emerged.105  In 1990, skirmishes broke out
between Serb and Croatian armed forces.106  In the spring of 1991, how-
ever, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic secretly met and agreed with
the Croatian president that each would secede from Yugoslavia, and both
would carve up and annex parts of Bosnia.107
Over the next eight months, Bosnia’s multi-ethnic Parliament split into
two separate assemblies— Serbian, and Muslim/Croat— each claiming to
rule Bosnia.108  Preparing for war, Serbia’s leaders deployed soldiers across
Bosnia.109  In April 1992, they launched the genocide, shelling the Muslim-
majority town of Zvornick and sending in a Serb paramilitary force that
sent thousands of Muslims fleeing.110  From then on, “Serb paramilitary
hit-squads swept through northern and eastern Bosnia,” expelling and
murdering Muslims.111
Serb paramilitaries rounded up Muslim men, women, and children
and either killed them immediately, or beat them with weapons and
marched them to concentration camps.112  Like the Nazis, the Serbs cru-
elly tormented their Muslim victims:
They were forced to sing Serb nationalist songs to entertain their jeering
tormentors . . . [and] avoid being beaten.  They were told . . . their wives had
been raped and . . . killed . . . .  They were forced, on pain of death, to
perform atrocities against each other: mutilation, physical and sexual, and
. . . mutual killing.113
In the ethnically mixed cities, the Serbs used Nazi tactics to drive out the
Muslims: “They were fired from their jobs. . . .  [H]arassed in the street.
Their homes . . . attacked and their businesses blown up at night.”114  By
December 2002 almost two million Bosnians— “nearly half the popula-
tion”— had been forced to flee their homes.115
The Serbs herded Muslims and Croats into concentration camps,
under inhuman conditions akin to the Holocaust.  In one of the largest
camps, known as Omarska, a survivor reported being locked with three
hundred men “inside a cage roughly 700 square feet . . . .  [With cages]
stacked four high . . . .  ‘There were no toilets and the prisoners . . . live[d]
103. CIGAR, supra note 101, at 18– 19, 34; JONES, supra note 4, at 317.
104. LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION 28– 29 (1997).
105. Id. at 31– 32, 34, 49, 83– 84.
106. Id. at 100– 03, 134– 35, 140– 43.
107. Id. at 144, 185, 212.
108. Id. at 216– 18.
109. Id. at 217– 18, 242– 43.
110. Id. at 222– 24.
111. Id. at 244.
112. Id. at 245.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 246.
115. Id. at 252.
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in their own filth, which dripped through the grates.’”116  The 11,000
camp prisoners suffered “every conceivable torture.  Throats were slit.
Guards forced prisoners to eat feces, to perform oral sex on other prison-
ers.  Men were castrated.”117  Bosnia’s women also suffered terribly: Serb
soldiers and paramilitaries raped an estimated 20,000, some in front of
their families.  Others held captive were raped daily by gangs of soldiers.118
By the late summer of 1992, the Serbs had “ethnically cleansed” and
taken control of about two-thirds of Bosnia.119  The genocide continued for
more than two years and included sieges, starvation, and shelling across
the major Bosnian cities of Sarajevo, Srebenica, Gorazde, and Tuzla.120
Western sanctions and NATO airstrikes finally forced the Serbs to the
negotiating table.  The resulting 1995 Dayton Accords left the Serbs in con-
trol of half of Bosnia, and a shrunken Muslim enclave surrounded by its
enemies from the just-finished war.121
2. Serbia’s Eliminationist Incitement
America’s ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1989 to 1992 has written,
“those who argue that ‘ancient Balkan hostilities’ account for the violence
that . . . destroyed Yugoslavia ignore the power of television in the service
of officially provoked racism.”122  Contrary to the reality that Balkan Mus-
lims were predominantly moderate and integrationist,123 “influential . . .
Serbia[ns] . . . shape[d] a stereotypical image of Muslims as alien, inferior,
and a threat to all that the Serbs held dear.”124
Serbian intellectuals promoted anti-Muslim stereotypes in such works
as the best-selling 1982 novel Noz (Knife), set in World War II and portray-
ing Muslims as “treacherous, cold-blooded murderers.”125  Through the
1980s, Serbian news outlets and conference speakers denounced Balkan
Muslims with such pejoratives as “offensive[,] . . . intolerant[,] . . . vampire
like”; “nomadic robber barons”; “fundamentalists”; “not capable of . . . per-
sonal freedom”; practitioners of “Serbophobia”; and the “most significant
116. Id. at 250.
117. NEIL KRESSEL, MASS HATE: THE GLOBAL RISE OF GENOCIDE AND TERROR 13 (2002).
118. Id. at 2– 3; WARBUTON MISSION, WARBURTON MISSION II REPORT: EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY INVESTIGATIVE MISSION INTO THE TREATMENT OF MUSLIM WOMEN IN THE FORMER YUGO-
SLAVIA ¶ 22 (1993), http://www.womenaid.org/press/info/humanrights/warburtonfull.
htm#.
119. See SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 104, at 244– 57.
120. See id. at 257– 352.
121. Id. at 377.
122. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 102, at 120; see also CIGAR, supra note 101, at 6, 13;
Schwartz, supra note 96 (“ ‘[A]ncient hatreds’ could not and did not combust spontane-
ously.  The blaze was prepared, lit, and stoked by the Serbian political leadership . . . .”);
SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 104, at 25.
123. ANGEL RABASA ET AL., RAND CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST PUBLIC POLICY, BUILDING
MODERATE MUSLIM NETWORKS 102 (2007), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/
MG574.html; Michael J. Totten, The (Really) Moderate Muslims of Kosovo, CITY J. (Fall
2008), http://www.city-journal.org/2008/18_4_kosovo_muslims.html.
124. CIGAR, supra note 101, at 24.
125. Id. at 104, at 25. See generally VUK DRASKOVIC, KNIFE (1982).
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threat to Yugoslavia.”126
In September 1986, a document titled the “Memorandum of the Ser-
bian Academy of Arts and Sciences” (“Serbian Memorandum”) was leaked
to the public.127  The document attained notoriety for its false claims that
“the Serbs faced total genocide” in Kosovo and Croatia,128 and that their
survival required a wholesale redrawing of the Yugoslav map to provide
“territorial unity of the Serbian people.”129  As one scholar summarized,
In this document, Serbia’s intellectual elite signed on to the theory that Ser-
bia, which had ruled over Yugoslavia for [seventy] years, was actually an
eternal victim of the more sophisticated Westernized nations within Yugosla-
via.  The Belgrade press . . . became filled with paranoid propaganda about
the threat [to Serbia] of Muslim fundamentalists, Albanian gangsters, and
. . . Croat fascists . . . .130
After the Serbian Memorandum’s disclosure, communist leaders and the
Yugoslav media denounced it— except for Serbian Communist Party chief
Slobodan Milosevic.131  Milosevic publicly adopted a militant, Serbian
nationalist agenda, which he leveraged into a takeover of the non-elective
Serbian presidency in 1987.132
Once in command, Milosevic seized control of the Serbian media.
Journalists who resisted Milosevic’s ethnic incitement campaign were fired
or prosecuted.133  Opposing politicians were purged.134  Over the next four
years, Milosevic’s government snuffed out resistance by taking over broad-
cast frequencies, imposing broadcast blackouts, monopolizing the news-
print supply, closing dissident media outlets, and deploying the police and
army to administer violence.135
As a result, from 1987, “Serbia’s state run media . . . unleash[ed] an
unprecedented barrage of attacks against other communities . . . highlight-
ing massacres of Serbs by Muslim[s] . . . during World War II and . . .
suggest[ing] that the same threat had reemerged.”136  The Milosevic
regime’s first propaganda target was the Muslims of neighboring Kosovo:
[N]ovelists, the Orthodox Church, philosophers, . . . University Professors,
party apparatchiks, slogans at public rallies, tabloid newspapers and televi-
sion news all insisted that Kosovo Serbs faced genocide from Albanian ‘ter-
rorist-separatists’, and that mere justice demanded the province be
reabsorbed into Serbia . . . .137
126. CIGAR, supra note 101, at 24– 30.
127. CIGAR, supra note 101, at 24– 30; SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 104, at 31.
128. SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 104, at 31.
129. CIGAR, supra note 101, at 23.
130. Schwartz, supra note 96.
131. SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 104, at 32– 33.
132. Id. at 37– 47; CIGAR, supra note 101, at 32– 33.
133. SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 104, at 42; MARK THOMPSON, FORGING WAR: THE
MEDIA IN SERBIA, CROATIA, AND BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 56– 57, 59– 60 (1994).
134. SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 104, at 40, 43– 47, 56– 57, 62, 120– 21.
135. SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 104, at 120– 21; THOMPSON, supra note 133, at
56– 63, 86– 93.
136. CIGAR, supra note 101, at 34; THOMPSON, supra note 133, at 55.
137. THOMPSON, supra note 133, at 55– 56.
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Like the Nazis’ Nuremberg spectacles, Milosevic’s rallies included chants
like, “We love you Slobodan because you hate the Muslims” and “I’ll be
first, who’ll be second, to drink some Turkish [Muslim] blood?”138
The incitement continued through 1990 and 1991, when Serbia
fought to annex Serb regions of Croatia, and throughout the 1992 genocide
in Bosnia.  Serb television called Muslims and Croats “evil-doers,” “cut-
throats,” and “wanton hordes,” and accused both of seeking “to destroy
everything Serbian” via “physical and spiritual genocide.”139  In October
1991, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic declared that if Bosnian Mus-
lims “opt for war,” they would “disappear from the face of the Earth.”140
Throughout the genocide, the Serb media portrayed an inverted reality: no
ethnic cleansing, but rather “Serb forces push[ing] back the [Muslim]
aggressors.”141
C. The Rwandan Hutu Genocide of the Rwandan Tutsi (1994)
1. Context and Conduct of the Genocide
Rwanda, located in East-Central Africa, is populated mostly by major-
ity Hutu and minority Tutsi tribes, all speaking the Kinyarwanda lan-
guage.142  Before colonization, a Tutsi monarchy governed the national and
provincial governments; Hutus governed locally.143  From the late nine-
teenth century, Germany and then Belgium colonized Rwanda.144  In
1933, the Belgians hardened the Hutu/Tutsi division by issuing tribal iden-
tity cards.145
By the 1950s, with Hutus demanding majority rule and Tutsis agitat-
ing for independence, the Belgians dismissed the Tutsi chiefs en masse and
installed a Hutu regime.  A Hutu-dominated Rwanda gained independence
in 1962.146  By then, a quarter million Rwandan Tutsis had fled and lived
in refugee camps outside Uganda.147  The next year, about 1,500 of those
refugees entered Rwanda in a failed attempt to depose the Hutu regime.
The government responded by killing between 10,000 and 14,000
Rwandan Tutsi, and imposing strict employment and educational quotas
on Tutsi.148
In 1989, plunging world coffee prices and a resulting recession
sparked opposition to the Hutu regime.149  In October 1990, a Tutsi refu-
gee army— the “Rwanda Patriotic Front” or “RPF”— attempted another
138. CIGAR, supra note 101, at 34.
139. THOMPSON, supra note 133, at 102.
140. CIGAR, supra note 101, at 37.
141. THOMPSON, supra note 133, at 104.
142. MELVERN, supra note 30, at 3– 5.
143. Id. at 5.
144. Id. at 4– 5.
145. Id. at 5– 6.
146. JONES, supra note 4, at 350; MELVERN, supra note 30, at 6– 8.
147. MELVERN, supra note 30, at 8.
148. Id. at 8– 9.
149. Id. at 13.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-2\CIN204.txt unknown Seq: 21 10-OCT-16 14:50
2016 Sanctioning State Sponsors of Genocide Incitement 435
failed invasion.150  The next four years witnessed growing anti-Tutsi
extremism in the government and military, paralleled by negotiations for a
more inclusive government in response to domestic unrest, Western diplo-
matic pressure, and a resurgent RPF.151  This culminated in the August
1993 Arusha Accords, a peace agreement proposing a multi-ethnic power
structure.152  But on April 6, 1994, after eight months of violent, Hutu
resistance to the Accords, the Hutu President’s airplane was shot down over
Kigali, the nation’s capital, by assassins whose identity and affiliation still
remain unknown.153
The genocide of the Tutsi commenced within hours of the crash.  As
with Bosnia, Western media coverage blamed the genocide on “ancient tri-
bal hatreds,” suggesting its inevitability, when “in reality, a planned annihi-
lation was taking place.”154  Since 1991, the Hutu-controlled army had
enlarged its civil defense forces in all ten Rwanda prefectures, declaring
“the principal enemy is the Tutsi, inside or outside the country . . . .”155
During that same time the President’s political party recruited a nation-
wide paramilitary youth group— the “Interhamwe”— trained them “to han-
dle weapons and use explosives” and to kill “at speed,” and taught them to
immobilize victims for mass killing “by having their Achilles heel cut.”156
On April 6th, hours after the President’s plane crash, the Hutu mili-
tary mobilized and ordered soldiers to start killing Tutsi.157  The
Interhwame paramilitaries also were given arms and told to “hunt the
Tutsi” down.”158  Killings immediately spread across the capital and other
prefectures.159  Within the week, ten thousand people were being mur-
dered each day in Kigali.160  In Butere prefecture, which includes Rwanda’s
second largest city and the national university, tens of thousands were mas-
sacred by killing squads.  At a church compound, an estimated twenty
thousand were murdered in just three days.  At the university, soldiers
rounded up and shot all Tutsi students.  At another church compound, tens
of thousands of Tutsi were surrounded by continuous gunfire for over six
hours, leaving “children crying over the bodies of their parents . . .
thousands . . . crying out in pain [who] could not move,” and death pits
filled with “mothers with their children still strapped at their backs.”161
As in the Nazi and Serbian genocides, the Hutu often tormented their
victims before killing them.  In Kibuye prefecture, the Hutu leadership
lured twenty thousand fleeing Tutsi to a stadium, shut the water supply,
150. Id. at 13– 16.
151. Id. at 16– 17, 22– 24, 33– 36.
152. Id. at 38– 39, 59– 60.
153. Id. at 72, 94, 101, 105-07, 110– 13, 132– 34; JONES, supra note 4, at 351– 52.
154. Linda Melvern, Missing the Story: The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, in THE
MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 198, 198 (2006).
155. MELVERN, supra note 30, at 21– 23.
156. Id. at 26.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 167– 71.
160. Id. at 207.
161. Id. at 212– 14.
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prevented food deliveries, and killed anyone emerging to look for nourish-
ment.  Days later, with children dying of hunger, the army and Interhamwe
threw grenades into the stadium and commenced mass shooting from atop
an adjacent hill.162
Under pressure from the United States, England, and France, the
United Nations withdrew its peacekeeping force in Rwanda, over its com-
mander’s objections.163  The genocide stopped only when the RPF— the
army of Tutsi refugees— fought its way back into the country, taking Kigali
on July 4th.164  Experts from the Red Cross, United Nations, and Rwanda
who witnessed the slaughter count approximately one million killed.165
Most were Tutsi, but many were Hutu who opposed the genocide.166  Most
killings were done with crude weapons or by hand:
Most victims were killed by machete (37.9%), followed by clubs (16.8%) and
firearms (14.8%).  Some 0.5% of the victims were women who had been
raped or cut open.  Other victims were forced to commit suicide, beaten to
death, thrown alive into rivers or lakes, or burned alive.  Infants and babies
were thrown against walls or crushed to death.167
Years later, the former interim President Jean Kambanda— who pled
guilty to genocide— recalled that “not one person in the country denounced
the massacres.  No one had the courage to do it.”168  This was genocide by
mass participation: “the civilian Hutu population— men, women, and even
children . . . comprised the bulk of ge´nocidaires . . . hundreds of thousands
of Hutus participated eagerly.”169  Post-genocide, at least 100,000
Rwandans were charged and detained pending trial for participating in the
killings.170
2. The Hutus’ Eliminationist Incitement
Despite ethnic tensions, the Rwandan media displayed minimal ethnic
incitement from 1970 to 1990.171  This dramatically changed in the four
years before the 1994 genocide, owing primarily to two media outlets allied
with and influenced by the regime: the newspaper Kangura, and the radio
station Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines, or “RTLM.”
The newspaper Kangura published its first issue in May 1990, and
promptly became the most influential print medium in Rwanda.172  As
Kangura rose to prominence, the Hutu regime persecuted opposition news-
162. Id. at 227.
163. Id. at 202– 06, 218– 19, 222.
164. Id. at 248.
165. Id. at 253.
166. Id. at 194– 95.
167. Id. at 253.
168. Id. at 1, 192.
169. JONES, supra note 4, at 346, 358.
170. MELVERN, supra note 30, at 252.
171. Darryl Li, Echoes of Violence: Considerations on Radio and Genocide in Rwanda, in
THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE, supra note 1, at 90, 93.
172. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T at 39– 40 (para. 122); Marcel Kabanda, in THE
MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE, supra note 1, at 62.
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papers, subjecting editors to interrogations, beatings, and lock-ups.173
From its dominant position, Kangura was found by the International Crim-
inal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to have “promot[ed] . . . fear and
hatred . . . of the Tutsi minority . . . in every issue . . . from February 1991
to March 1994 . . . in language clearly intended to fan the flames of resent-
ment and anger . . . .”174
For example, Kangura’s December 1990 issue published “The Ten
Commandments” of the Hutu, in an article describing the Tutsi as “blood-
thirsty,” “dishonest in their business dealings,” and “seeking ethnic
supremacy.”175  The article labeled as a traitor any Hutu who does busi-
ness with a Tutsi or Tutsi company, or who “befriends, employs, or marries
a Tutsi.”  It also called for teaching “the Hutu ideology . . . to Hutus at all
levels,” and directed the Hutu to “cease feeling pity for the Tutsi” and to
“prepare[ ] to defend themselves against this scourge.”176
Articles in Kangura frequently referred to Tutsi as “Inyenzi”— Kinyar-
wandan for cockroaches.177  The cover of Kangura’s November 1991 issue
effectively called for genocide, posting in large print, “What arms shall we
use to conquer the Inyenzi once and for all?” adjacent to a large drawing of
a machete.  The same issue called the Tutsi “hypocrites, thieves and kill-
ers.”178  Editorials in other Kangura issues denounced the “Inyenzi” for
“killing, looting, [and] raping young girls and women,” and compared the
Tutsi to a “snake whose venom is extremely poisonous,” and “whose wick-
edness is indescribable.”179 Kangura published false stories of Tutsi
depravity; in February 1993, it claimed that a group of Tutsi “caught a
Hutu, cut his genitals and requested the wife to carry them and . . . to eat
them.”180
In January 1994, on the eve of the genocide, Kangura echoed the Nazi
and the Serbian regimes with this chilling warning:
Let’s hope the Inyenzi will have the courage to understand . . . that if they
make a small mistake, they will be exterminated; if they make the mistake of
attacking again, there will be none of them left in Rwanda, not even a single
accomplice.  All the Hutus are united . . . .181
Following in Kangura’s wake, RTLM made its first radio broadcast in
July 1993 on the eve of the signing of the Arusha Accords— which called for
power-sharing with the Tutsi.  RTLM became “the medium of mass commu-
173. Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro, Rwandan Private Print Media on the Eve of the Geno-
cide, in THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE, supra note 1, at 83.  However, some oppo-
sition newspapers continued to function. Id. at 83.
174. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T at 80 (paras. 245– 46) (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 45– 46 (paras. 138– 39).
176. Id. at 46– 47 (para. 139); MELVERN, supra note 30, at 50.
177. Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro, supra note 173, at 84– 85.
178. Charity Kagwi-Ndungu, The Challenges in Prosecuting Print Media for Incitement
to Genocide, in THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE, supra note 1, at 330, 335.
179. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T at 60 (para. 179).
180. Id. at 61 (para. 182).
181. Id. at 70 (para. 215).
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nication with the broadest reach in Rwanda.”182  RTLM was financed and
supported by the Hutu President and ruling elite.183  From October 1993,
when the first Hutu President of neighboring Burundi was assassinated,
RTLM’s anti-Tutsi broadcasts became especially virulent.184  The ICTR
found that
RTLM broadcasts . . . promoted contempt and hatred for the Tutsi popula-
tion . . . [and] exploited the history of Tutsi privilege and Hutu disadvantage,
and the fear of armed insurrection, to mobilize the population, whipping
them into a frenzy of hatred and violence . . . against the Tutsi ethnic
group.185
Like Kangura, RTLM repeatedly denounced the Tutsi as Inyenzi (cock-
roaches).  It called them “treacherous people” who were planning to return
the Hutus to a state of “slavery.”186
When the genocide began on April 6, 1994, RTLM’s broadcasts
“turned into a seemingly non-stop call for the extermination of the
Tutsi.”187  Praised by the new Hutu Prime Minister as “one of the key
weapons in the [anti-Tutsi] war,” RTLM declared that “killing the enemy
was the duty of every Rwandan.”188  On April 16th, RTLM broadcasted a
government call “for citizens to take up arms nationwide and mount road-
blocks”— where Tutsis were identified and killed on the spot.189  A study
later found that over nine percent of all RTLM broadcasts constituted either
“direct calls for exterminating” members of the Rwanda Patriotic Army and
its supporters, or “congratulatory messages” after such exterminations
were carried out.190
RTLM also helped to identify and target specific Tutsis for killing.  As
the ICTR later found, “[b]oth before and after 6 April 1994, RTLM broad-
cast the names of Tutsi individuals and their families, . . . [and] Hutu politi-
cal opponents,” many of whom were later killed.”191  RTLM ordered Tutsi
civilians “to come out of hiding and to return home or to go to the road-
blocks, where they were . . . killed in accordance with . . . subsequent RTLM
broadcasts tracking their movement.”192
182. Id. at 117 (para. 342); id. at 166 (para. 488).
183. Alison des Forges, Call to Genocide: Radio in Rwanda, 1994, in THE MEDIA AND THE
RWANDA GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 44.
184. Id. at 45.
185. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T at 165– 66 (paras. 486– 88).
186. Mary Kimani, RTLM: The Medium that Became a Tool for Mass Murder, in THE
MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE, supra note 1, at 110, 112.
187. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T at 165 (para. 485).
188. Kimani, supra note 186, at 113.
189. MELVERN, supra note 30, at 201, 205.
190. Kimani, supra note 186, at 119.
191. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T at 165 (para. 487).
192. Id.
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III. Incitement as a Contributing Cause of Genocide: Theory and
Evidence
In all three of the preceding historical accounts, extensive genocide
incitement filled the print and broadcast media prior to the actual geno-
cides.  By seizing control of the media and unleashing this rhetorical flood,
the leaders who planned and directed the genocides manifested the belief
that incitement was a critical tool in achieving their goals.193  But were they
correct?  This Part seeks to address that question, both through the work of
genocide scholars and historians, and from an array of social psychology
experiments.
The discussion that follows is structured around three implications of
the several cited studies: (1) large-scale, dehumanizing hate propaganda is
a common occurrence preceding genocides; (2) most perpetrators of geno-
cidal mass killings do not manifest pre-existing psychopathologies or vio-
lent inclinations, but rather are drawn from the ranks of ordinary people;
and (3) triggering the “perpetrator mindset” in ordinary people has proven
to be remarkably easy, and dehumanization plays a significant role in that
psychological transformation.
A. The Recurring Pattern of Dehumanizing Hate Language
Genocide scholars regularly identify media incitement as one of the
common steps along the pathway to genocide.  In an especially comprehen-
sive study of genocides throughout history, Prof. Adam Jones concluded
that:
A standard feature of genocidal mobilization is hate propaganda, including
in mass media, public political speech, websites, graffiti, and more diffuse
discourse strategies, such as rumor and gossip . . . .  Hate speech underpins
“exclusionary ideologies . . . that define target groups as expendable.”194
In an extensive discussion of twentieth-century mass killings, Prof.
Daniel Jonah Goldhagen found an association between such events and
“the sway of ideologies” that portray others “as deserving death or elimina-
tion.”195  This “ideologizing of a society” often follows an undemocratic
193. A noteworthy example of this was a mimeographed document found in
Rwanda’s Butere prefecture after the genocide, captioned “Note Relative a` la Propa-
gandece D’Expansion et de Recrutement.”  Citing Lenin and Joseph Goebbels, the anon-
ymous author described how propaganda can influence the public, and endorsed the
use of “lies, exaggeration, ridicule, and innuendo to attack the opponent.”  The author
advocated a tactic called “accusation in the mirror,” whereby “ ‘the party which is using
terror will accuse the enemy of using terror’ . . . [thereby] persuad[ing] listeners and
‘honest people’ that they are being attacked and are justified in taking whatever mea-
sures are necessary ‘for legitimate [self-]defense.’” ALLISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO
TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 75– 76 (1999), http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/
r/rwanda/rwanda993.pdf.  The above histories make clear that this tactic was broadly
employed by the Nazi, Serb, and Rwandan Hutu regimes to incite exaggerated fears of
the groups they targeted for genocide.
194. JONES, supra note 4, at 570 (quoting TED GURR & BARBARA HARFF, ETHNIC CON-
FLICT IN WORLD POLITICS 80 (1994)).
195. GOLDHAGEN, supra note 2, at 204.
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power seizure, “usually through revolution or coup.”196  The new leaders
then “educate the young in their creed,” creating over time “an ever growing
reservoir of people [who adopt] beliefs that make them willing to eliminate
enemies, including by lethal means.”197
The centrality of media incitement also appears in the genocide model
developed by Prof. Gregory Stanton, founder and President of the non-
profit organization Genocide Watch.  Stanton identifies ten stages through
which genocides ordinarily come to happen:
(1)  Classification: “categories to distinguish people into ‘us and them’”;
(2)  Symbolization: “giv[ing] names or other symbols to the classifications”;
(3)  Discrimination: “a dominant group us[ing] law, custom, and political
power to deny the rights of other groups”;
(4)  Dehumanization: “[o]ne group den[ying] the humanity of the other
group . . . . equat[ing the latter] with animals, vermin, insects or diseases”;
(5)  Organization “usually by the state, often using militias,” planning “for
genocidal killings”;
(6)  Polarization: “[e]xtremists driv[ing] the groups apart”;
(7)  Preparation: “perpetrator group leaders plan[ning] the ‘Final Solution’ to
the . . . targeted group . . . often us[ing] euphemisms to cloak their
intentions”;
(8)  Persecution: “identif[ying] and separat[ing victims] because of their eth-
nic or religious identity” with “[d]eath lists . . . drawn up”;
(9)  Extermination: the “mass killing”; and
(10)  Denial: the aftermath, when perpetrators “deny . . . any crimes . . .
blame what happened on the victims . . . [and] block investigations of the
crimes.”198
At least three of those ten stages involve media incitement, viz.:
(4) Dehumanization, where “hate propaganda in print and on hate radios
is used to vilify the victim group”; (6) Polarization, where “[h]ate groups
broadcast polarizing propaganda”; and (7) Preparation, where the perpe-
trator group “indoctrinate[s] the populace with fear of the victim
group.”199
Scholars at the Genocide Prevention Program of Hebrew University,
Israel, conclude from the evidence of several twentieth-century genocides,
that “[h]ate language and incitement together increase risks for genocide,
especially when they come from the top down in authoritarian regimes
with their environments of coercion, direction[,] and instruction.”200
While acknowledging that “not all incitement leads to genocide,” and that
196. Id.
197. GOLDHAGEN, WORSE THAN WAR, supra note 48, at 204– 05.
198. Gregory H. Stanton, The Ten Stages of Genocide, GENOCIDE WATCH, http://www.
genocidewatch.org/genocide/tenstagesofgenocide.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
199. Id.  The Rwanda experience showed how the incitement media also could be
used to target particular individuals and locations, thereby materially assisting the
implementation of stages (8) and (9), Persecution and Extermination. See discussion
supra Section II.C.
200. ELIHU RICHTER ET AL., CAN WE PREVENT GENOCIDE BY PREVENTING INCITEMENT? 7
(2009), http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Articles_Can_we_prevent_genocide_by_
preventing_incitement.pdf.
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“genocide may occur without evidence of . . . incitement,” they advise that
when political leaders “use explicit pseudo medical and epidemiologic met-
aphors, such as microbes, filth, cancer, typhoid, and rats, to dehumanize
victim groups, it is prudent to regard such language as an urgent warning
sign of imminent genocide . . . .”201
Drawing upon concepts from epidemiology, the Hebrew University
authors suggest that genocide perpetrators are most effectively shaped and
activated by “massive population-wide exposure to hate language and
incitement,” which “shift[s] the distribution curve for the level of hate
to . . . produce[ ] a pool of potential perpetrators and complicit bystand-
ers.”  The authors propose this epidemiological model to explain “why
architects of genocide find it useful to direct their messages of hate at the
total population.”202
That last observation is corroborated by a significant and perhaps
counterintuitive finding discussed below, namely, that the perpetrators
who carry out genocides are rarely distinguishable by any evident psycho-
pathologies or pre-existing propensities for violence, but rather are drawn
from the ranks of ordinary people, and reflect a broad cross-section of their
societies.
B. Most Perpetrators are Ordinary People, not Psychopaths
Prior to the 1945, war crimes prosecutions of the Nazi high command
in Nuremberg, Germany, the United States Army assigned a psychiatrist
and a psychologist to administer psychological tests to the more than
twenty Nazi leaders awaiting trial.203  Twenty-one of the defendants were
given IQ tests, which generated a range of 106 to 143 and an average of
128, which fell “in the superior to very superior range of intellectual
abilities.”204
Nineteen of the Nuremberg defendants also were given Rorshach per-
sonality tests, in which the subjects are presented with a series of symmet-
rical inkblots, asked what each one might represent, and then are assessed
for the method and substance of their answers.205  Following disputes over
the interpretations of the tests among the two examiners, the raw test
responses remained unpublished for three decades.206  But after their pub-
lication in the 1970s, and further debates over interpretation, the “defini-
tive study” of the responses concluded that “[t]he leaders of Nazi
Germany . . . were, for the most part, extremely able, intelligent, high-func-
tioning people.  They were average German citizens . . . .  There was no
evidence of thought disorder or psychiatric conditions in most of these
201. Id. at 7– 8.
202. Id. at 16– 17.
203. JAMES WALLER, BECOMING EVIL: HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE COMMIT GENOCIDE AND
MASS KILLING 63 (2d ed. 2007).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 63– 64.
206. Id. at 64– 68.
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men.”207
A similar set of Rorshach tests was administered in 1946 to almost 200
rank-and-file Nazis and Nazi collaborators who were awaiting war crimes
trials in Copenhagen.208  Although the tests “showed some unusual
thought patterns (for example, rigid and pessimistic thinking),” the devia-
tions were “not enough to indicate grossly disturbed thinking.  Neither did
the perpetrators’ responses demonstrate any particular inclination toward
violence.”209
Studies of the Nazis’ killing squads reveal that their members were not
selected for any evident ability or desire to conduct mass killing, but rather
were indistinguishable from the general population.  In what is deemed the
most thorough study to date, Prof. Christopher Browning reviewed and
analyzed the post-war interrogation transcripts of 210 members of Police
Battalion 101 (PB 101), a unit of approximately five hundred men deployed
from Germany into Poland to carry out mass killings of Jewish civilians.210
Between June 1942 and May 1943, PB 101 executed at least 38,000 Jews
and deported another 45,000 to certain death at the Treblinka extermina-
tion camp.211
Most of PB 101’s members came from the city of Hamburg, “by reputa-
tion one of the least Nazified cities in Germany . . . .”212  Of the rank-and-
file, sixty-three percent had working class backgrounds, e.g., dock workers,
truck drivers, construction workers, and machine operators; thirty-five per-
cent had lower middle class backgrounds, e.g., sales and office work; and
two percent had professional backgrounds, e.g., pharmacists and teachers.
Their average age was thirty-nine, and only twenty-five percent were Nazi
party members.213  Browning’s assessment of the “selection for killing”
question merits quoting at length:
Did any . . . policy of selection . . . of personnel particularly suited for
mass murder, determine the makeup of Reserve Police Battalion 101?
Concerning the rank and file, the answer is a qualified no.  By most
criteria, just the opposite was the case.  By age, geographical origin, and
social background, the men of Police Battalion 101 were least likely to be
considered apt material out of which to mold future mass killers . . . .  [T]he
rank and file— middle-aged, mostly working-class, from Hamburg— did not
represent special selection or even random selection but for all practical pur-
poses negative selection for the task at hand.
In short, [PB 101] was not sent to Lublin to murder Jews because it was
composed of men specially selected or deemed particularly suited for the
task.  On the contrary, the battalion was the “dregs” of the manpower pool
207. Id. at 69.
208. Id. at 70.
209. WALLER, supra note 203, at 70.
210. CHRISTOPHER BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE BATTALION 101 AND THE
FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND, at xvii (1992).
211. Id. at 142.
212. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
213. Id. at 47– 48.
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available . . . for such behind-the-lines [killing] duties.214
And yet, nearly all of PB 101’s members quickly became mass killers
of unarmed men, women, and children, together murdering tens of
thousands in a year.  In this regard, perhaps Browning’s most significant
finding is that what transformed these men into mass murderers was not
coercion and duress.  Before the first mass killing operation, in the Polish
town of Josefow, PB 101’s commander declared to the assembled troops
that “if any of the older men among them did not feel up to the task that lay
before them, he could step out.”  About a dozen men accepted the offer,
and after the day’s killing commenced, several more officers asked and
obtained permission not to participate in the slaughter.215  Far from being
punished, the objectors were given alternate duties, such as guarding the
marketplace where the Jews had been rounded up, and in subsequent
months, objectors received transfers to other squads and localities.216
Other studies have yielded similar conclusions.  As Prof. Daniel Jonah
Goldhagen summed up the evidence, “The study of police battalions,
finally, yields two fundamental facts: First, ordinary Germans easily
became genocidal killers.  Second, they did so even though they did not
have to.”217  As for what did turn them into killers, Browning refrains from
any single answer, instead suggesting several possible causes.  One of
which was that
the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101, like the rest of German society,
were immersed in a deluge of racist and anti-Semitic propaganda.  Further-
more, the Order Police provided for indoctrination both in basic training
and as an ongoing practice within each unit.  Such incessant propagandizing
must have had a considerable effect . . . .218
To examine what effects “incessant propagandizing must have had,”219 this
Article turns to the social psychology laboratory for further evidence.
C. Experimental Proof that the Perpetrator Mindset is Easily Activated
In recent decades, experiments by social psychologists have illumi-
nated an array of latent predispositions that replicate various aspects of
what may be called the “perpetrator mindset.”  As the following descrip-
tions indicate, the experiments “activated” the predispositions by exposing
people to circumstances that briefly replicate small parts of mass hate cam-
paigns similar to those reported in Part II.  For example, the experiments
assigned people to in-groups and out-groups; surrounded people with false
information; publicly mistreated innocent persons; directed people to pun-
ish strangers; and assigned demeaning labels to “others.”
214. Id. at 164– 65; see also WALLER, supra note 203, at 91 (“The truth seems to be . . .
that the most outstanding common characteristic of perpetrators of extraordinary evil is
their normality, not their abnormality.”).
215. BROWNING, supra note 210, at 2, 57.
216. Id. at 62– 63, 68, 73– 76, 170– 71.
217. GOLDHAGEN, supra note 2, at 277.
218. BROWNING, supra note 210, at 184.
219. Id.
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By showing how easily the predispositions are activated, the experi-
ments help explain why, for instance, the “ordinary people” who com-
prised the membership of PB 101 studied by Browning willingly conducted
acts of genocide— even when given the opportunity to decline.  As dis-
cussed below, these predispositions include: in-group bias; conformity to
majorities; weakness of altruism towards strangers; blaming of innocent
victims; readiness to demean and torment subordinate “others”; the power-
ful influence of authority structures; and the powerful influence of negative
labels and dehumanization.  After reviewing the experimental evidence,
two studies of real-world hate incitement are discussed, which corroborate
the laboratory findings.
1. In-Group Bias
Evolutionary psychologists maintain that humans “evolved to live in
groups” because the social adaptations required to “unite with those in our
group” conferred the survival advantage of “win[ning] competitions across
groups.”220  One consequence of this group selection process is a dual psy-
chological predisposition that “favors within-group niceness and between-
group nastiness.”221  Two experiments illustrate the power of in-group
bias, in both adults and children.
A British researcher, Henry Tajfel, designed a study which assigned
strangers to one of two groups, “using the most . . . trivial criteria imagina-
ble.”222  In some iterations of the experiment, the group assignment crite-
ria were: a coin toss; expressed musical preferences; estimates of the
number of dots on a screen; and expressed preferences for one of two
abstract artists.  To minimize group attachments, each group’s members
remained anonymous to each other and had no social interactions; they
also had no interactions with the other group.223  Even across these mini-
malist divisions— and absent any social bonding— the subjects displayed
clear in-group bias: “they rated members of their own group as more pleas-
ant and better workers . . . liked the members of their own group better,”
and when given a choice, “allocated more money” to their own group mem-
bers.  This experiment has been replicated more than twenty times in sev-
eral countries.224
In 1954, Prof. Muzafar Sherif demonstrated the violent potential of in-
group bias with a group of eleven and twelve-year-old boys in the “Robbers
Cave” experiment.  In a state park bearing that name, the boys separately
arrived in two groups of eleven, and were assigned to cabins in different
locations; each group remained unaware of the other.225  For six days the
groups stayed apart, each one bonding over sports and outdoor activities.
220. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND 244 (2012).
221. WALLER, supra note 204, at 158 (emphasis in original).
222. Id. at 175.
223. Id. at 175– 76.
224. Id. at 176.
225. HAIDT, supra note 220, at 138– 39.
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Then the experimenters staged a week of sports and camping contests
between the groups.  Almost immediately,
[t]ribal behavior increased dramatically.  Both sides created flags and hung
them in contested territory.  They destroyed each other’s flags, raided and
vandalized each other’s bunks, called each other nasty names, made weap-
ons (socks filled with rocks), and would often have come to blows had the
counselors not intervened.226
This experiment highlighted the fact that “whenever groups form, their
members sense the existence of boundaries that divide them from other
groups— even when there is no blood relation, common history, or prior
similarity.”227
2. Conformity to Majorities
Conformity is deemed another evolutionary adaptation that confers
survival advantages through group success.228  In 1955, Prof. Soloman
Asch demonstrated the power of conformity to override rational judgment
in a series of “line matching” experiments.  Each subject was shown a set of
three lines of different lengths, and a card displaying a single line that
matched one of the other three lines.  The subjects were asked which of the
three lines matched the latter card’s line.229  When tested separately, each
of the subjects gave the correct answer at least ninety-nine percent of the
time— indicating that the correct answers were rather obvious.230  Then
Asch had each subject take the test together with seven other “subjects,” all
of whom had been instructed to give the same wrong answer on certain
designated tests.  Seventy percent of the actual subjects conformed to the
crowd’s wrong answer on at least some of those staged tests, and thirty
percent conformed on a majority of the staged tests.231  Asked later how
often they had erroneously conformed, the subjects gave incorrectly low
numbers: “[t]hey remained independent— in their minds but not in their
actions.”232  These results have been replicated in dozens of variations
around the world.233
The same tendency to conform appears even in matters of urgent
safety.  A Columbia University researcher arranged for student subjects to
sit in a room filling out a questionnaire, during which smoke began flow-
ing into the room from a vent; eventually it filled the room.234  When sub-
jects were alone in the room, seventy-five percent got up to report the
smoke.  When subjects were in the room with two others, however, the
latter having been instructed to remain passively in their seats, only ten
226. Id.
227. WALLER, supra note 204, at 198.
228. Id. at 261.





233. KRESSEL, supra note 117, at 150.
234. Id.
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percent of the actual subjects got up to report the smoke.235
3. Weakness of Altruism Towards Strangers
Kin selection— the favoring of relatives over non-kin, and of close rela-
tives over more distant ones— is an evolutionary legacy that renders altru-
ism towards strangers a comparatively weak instinct.236  A corollary
theory, the “bystander effect,” holds that one’s likelihood of intervening to
aid a stranger in harm’s way decreases the more one perceives the presence
of other bystanders.237  The latter was demonstrated in an experiment that
placed a subject in a conversation with another person over an intercom,
during which the second person pretended to suffer an epileptic
seizure.238  When the subjects were led to believe that no one else was lis-
tening, eighty-five percent of them intervened to try to assist the second
person, but when the subjects were led to believe that another person was
listening, the intervention rate dropped to sixty-two percent.  When the
subjects were led to believe that five others were listening, the rate dropped
to thirty-one percent.239
Another study arranged for a series of seminary students to agree to
give a lecture to a class of high school students.  Some were led to believe
that they had ample time to get to the class, while others were led to believe
that they had no time to spare.  As each seminarian walked to the class, the
experimenters arranged for a young man to collapse in front of the subject.
Those with ample time intervened to assist; those short of time did not.240
In a variation of the experiment, the seminarians were asked to focus their
lectures on the parable of the Good Samaritan helping strangers.  Being
mindful of the Good Samaritan hardly made a difference: ninety percent of
the time-constrained seminarians still failed to intervene.241
4. Blaming of Innocent Victims
Social psychologist Melvin Lerner identifies “the just-world phenome-
non” as “the tendency of people to believe that the world is just and . . .
therefore people get what they deserve and deserve what they get.”242  Ler-
ner documented this phenomenon in an experiment where two people
were shown to be “working equally hard on the same task,” but then
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL 160 (1995).
237. Nicholas Lemann, A Call for Help: What the Kitty Genovese story really means,
NEW YORKER (March 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/03/10/a-call-
for-help.  The Kitty Genovese story— which is about the failure of most neighbors in an
apartment building to call police in response to the screams of a murder victim— is often
cited as an egregious example of the bystander effect; but subsequent reassessments
have found the neighbors’ willful passivity less pronounced than initially reported. See
id.
238. KRESSEL, supra note 117, at 151.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.; ZIMBARDO, supra note 229, at 317.
242. WALLER, supra note 203, at 213.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-2\CIN204.txt unknown Seq: 33 10-OCT-16 14:50
2016 Sanctioning State Sponsors of Genocide Incitement 447
received highly differential rewards based on a random coin flip.243
Observers who were asked to explain what happened— and who had just
seen the coin flip determine the rewards— “convinced themselves that the
unlucky person who had lost the coin flip must have worked less hard.”244
Other experiments, including ones involving the apparent infliction of
pain on innocent victims, also yielded rationalizations by observers that
the victims must have done something to deserve punishment.245  In real
life, post-Holocaust interviews of Germans— both perpetrators and non-
perpetrators— regularly found them to be assigning fault to Jewish victims,
and suggesting that the Jews shared in the blame for their fate.246
5. Readiness to Demean and Torment Subordinate “Others”
In 1971, in what became known as the Stanford Prison Experiment
(SPE), a research team led by psychology Professor Phillip Zimbardo set up
a mock prison with “guards” and “prisoners” consisting of pre-screened,
psychologically well-adjusted students.247  The SPE team advertised for
subject-volunteers, offering $15 daily pay.  The research team screened out
from the volunteers anyone with a prior arrest, and anyone with “medical
or mental problems.”248  Psychological assessments and in-depth inter-
views then pared the group to about two dozen young men, all of whom
“seemed . . . normal, healthy, and average on all . . . psychological dimen-
sions . . . representative of middle class, educated youth.”249  When asked
their role preferences, none wanted to be a guard; all wished to be
prisoners.250
The SPE team randomly selected nine subjects to be prisoners, with
the remainder assigned to one of three daily, eight-hour guard shifts.
Guards received a “brief orientation” before the prisoners were brought in
and were told “to maintain law and order, no violence against prisoners,
and not allow any escapes.”251  The experiment was supposed to last two
weeks.252
From the first day’s cycle, the guards became abusive and demeaning,
imposing long, repeated “prisoner counts,” forcing the prisoners to call or
sing out their numbers according to arbitrary commands, and punishing
them repeatedly with push-ups and verbal abuse.253  This soon escalated
into restricting food and toilet access, multiple sleep interruptions, shoving
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 214.
246. Id. at 215.
247. ZIMBARDO, supra note 229, at 6, 30– 31.
248. Id. at 30.
249. Id. at 32– 33.
250. Id. at 30.
251. Id. at 31.  Zimbardo also “tried to convey to them the kind of psychological
mind-set of prisoners being powerless that [the SPE team] want[ed] to create” in the
mock prison. Id.
252. Id. at 30.
253. See, e.g., id. at 172.
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prisoners up and down stairs or into urinals, forcing them into sexually
degrading poses, and locking them in an isolation cell.254  With some pris-
oners mentally breaking down and needing to be released, the SPE team
aborted the experiment on the sixth day.255  Waller sums up the results as
follows:
Despite their knowledge that they might just as easily have been randomly
assigned as prisoners, about a third of the eleven guards took on cruel, . . .
sadistic, dominating, . . . tyrannical, coercive, and aggressive roles.  These
guards became extremely hostile, arbitrary, and inventive in their forms of
degradation and humiliation, and they appeared to thoroughly enjoy the
power that they wielded . . . .256
In subsequent interviews, the prisoner-subjects identified five sadistic
guards, two good guards who avoided abuse and did small favors, and
three to four in the middle who imposed the rules but went “by the
book.”257  This result later evoked an eerie parallel from Christopher
Browning:
Zimbardo’s spectrum of guard behavior bears an uncanny resemblance to
the groupings that emerged within Reserve Police Battalion 101: a nucleus of
increasingly enthusiastic killers . . . .  [A] larger group of policemen who
performed as shooters . . . but who did not seek opportunities to kill . . . and
a small group . . . of refusers and evaders.258
In this respect, the laboratory replicated the Nazi foot soldiers’ descent
from ordinary, well-adjusted lives into perpetrators of sadistic cruelty— but
in the SPE, this happened with minimal prompting by those having author-
ity over the prison guards.
6. The Powerful Influence of Authority Structures
By contrast, the power of authority structures to compel sadistic
behavior was vividly demonstrated by the famous “obedience to authority”
experiments conducted by Yale Professor Stanley Milgram in the years
1960– 1963.259  The set-up of each experiment involved a “teacher” and a
“learner,” both guided by an “experimenter.”  In fact, both the learner and
experimenter were acting out scripted roles; the only experimental subject
was the “teacher.”260
Each teacher-subject was told that the experiment was a study of the
effects of punishment on learning.  With the teacher-subject watching, the
experimenter strapped the learner into a chair and attached an electrode to
his arm.  The experimenter explained that the teacher would read to the
learner a series of word pairs and then quiz him on them, giving shocks for
wrong answers.  The teacher was seated at a “shock generator,” displaying
254. See generally id. at 40– 176.
255. Id. at 171– 72.
256. WALLER, supra note 203, at 237.
257. ZIMBARDO, supra note 229, at 182– 83.
258. BROWNING, supra note 210, at 168.
259. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, at xi– xvii (1973).
260. Id. at 3.
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thirty switches from fifteen to 450 volts and labels from “SLIGHT SHOCK”
to “DANGER– SEVERE SHOCK.”  The experimenter directed that with each
wrong answer by the learner, the teacher should administer a progressively
higher shock.261  Before starting, the teacher was given a sample forty-five
volt shock.262
Although the learner was never really shocked, he had a standard
script for responding to the different “shock” levels, escalating upward
through grunting, pained groaning, begging to be released, screaming in
agony, and eventually, silence.263  The experimenter had a standard
sequence of commands for prodding the teacher to continue giving shocks,
such as “please go on,” “the experiment requires that you continue,” and “it
is absolutely essential that you continue.”264  Subjects were recruited from
New Haven, Connecticut for a “memory and learning” experiment via
newspaper ads and mass mailings, generating a mix of forty percent skilled
and unskilled workers, forty percent sales and business employees, and
twenty percent professionals.265
Milgram canvassed a group of psychiatrists about how they expected
the teacher-subjects would perform: they predicted that most “would not go
beyond the [tenth of thirty] levels . . . when the victim makes his first
explicit demand to be freed[ ]; about four percent would reach the twenti-
eth shock level, and about one . . . in a thousand would administer the
highest shock [level].”266  In fact, those experts grossly underestimated the
pain levels that a large majority of subjects administered.  Out of forty sub-
jects, thirty-nine of them— over ninety-seven percent— reached or exceeded
the tenth shock level, where the learner is begging to be released; thirty-one
of the forty— over seventy percent— reached or exceeded the twentieth
shock level, where the learner is screaming in agony; and twenty-five of
forty— over sixty-two percent— administered the highest shock level, labeled
“DANGER– SEVERE SHOCK,” where the learner apparently has collapsed
into unconsciousness, or worse.267
Milgram conducted several permutations of the experiment, yielding
some changes in the results, but with most still showing a large majority of
subjects administering very severe shocks.  Blocking out the groans and
screams of the learner somewhat increased the number of subjects deliver-
ing high shock levels; whereas placing the subject alongside the evidently
agonized learner reduced by about half, the number who continued on to
the highest shock level.  But even then, ninety-seven percent reached or
exceeded the tenth level (“strong shock”), and forty percent reached or
exceeded the twentieth level (“intense shock”).268  Running the experiment
with female subjects generated results “virtually identical to the perform-
261. Id.
262. Id. at 20.
263. Id. at 22– 23.
264. Id. at 21.
265. Id. at 15– 16.
266. Id. at 31; see also id. at 4, 28 (regarding shock levels and learner’s responses).
267. Id. at 34– 35; see also id. at 4, 28 (regarding shock levels and learner’s responses).
268. Id. at 35.
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ance of men.”269
Milgram’s results have been replicated at least forty times across sev-
eral countries.270  It appears to be a human universal that, when instructed
by authority figures perceived as legitimate, people can readily inflict
extraordinary pain on strangers.  This is consistent with all three case stud-
ies discussed in Part II, above.  As Professor Steven Pinker has observed,
“genocides sear the moral imagination by the gratuitous sadism indulged
in by the perpetrators.”271
7. The Powerful Influence of Negative Labels and Dehumanization
In a variation of the Milgram experiments, a Stanford research team
led by Professor Albert Bandura examined whether the willingness to
inflict painful shocks on “learners” would be affected by dehumanizing
descriptions of them.  Each teacher-subject was seated in a cubicle facing a
“shock generator” displaying ten escalating shock levels.  The “learners”
were said to be a small group solving a series of decision-making problems;
when the group failed to provide an adequate solution, a red light would
flash in the cubicle, and the teacher was supposed to “punish th[e learners]
by administering a shock in any intensity they saw fit.”272  Thus, unlike the
Milgram scenario, the teacher-subjects were given free discretion to choose
the shock levels.
The experimenters added a “dehumanization variable” by playing one
of three alternative recordings over an intercom in the cubicles, made to
sound as if the experimenters had “inadvertently” left a microphone on.
The teacher-subjects “overheard” the experimenters in one of the following
conversational variations: (1) describing the learners as an animalistic, rot-
ten bunch (the dehumanized condition); (2) describing the learners as a
perceptive, understanding group (the humanized condition); and (3) not
referring to the learners at all (the neutral condition).273  The experiment
then commenced through a series of ten decision-making tests of the learn-
ers.  In fact, there were neither “learners” nor actual shocks, but the teach-
ers were led to believe that they were administering shocks when the red
light flashed.
The results showed a significant contrast in punishment severity
between the dehumanized and humanized conditions.  “Dehumanized
[learners] were treated most punitively, humanized ones were spared pain-
ful shocks, while neutral ones [received] an intermediate level of punish-
269. Id. at 63.  One of the strongest factors reducing obedience occurred when Mil-
gram inserted a second “teacher,” whose pre-arranged role was to rebel against the
experimenter and refuse to give more shocks: several actual subject-teachers rebelled at
that point. Id. at 117– 21.
270. WALLER, supra note 203, at 110.
271. PINKER, supra note 47, at 322.
272. Albert Bandura, Bill Underwood & Michael E. Fromson, Disinhibition of Aggres-
sion through Diffusion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims, 9 J. RES. PERSONAL-
ITY 253, 257 (1975).
273. Id. at 257– 58.
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ment.”274  By the last of ten tests, the subjects delivered shock levels of
between six and seven (out of ten) to the dehumanized learners, versus
between two and three to the humanized learners— a two- to three-fold dif-
ference of severity.275  Perhaps most significant, this difference followed
from just a few overheard comments on a single occasion— far from the
pervasive and protracted deluge of hate incitement described in the geno-
cide case studies from Part II, above.
8. Hate Incitement in Practice
The above experiments received a measure of real-world corroboration
in a study of the effects on children of “martyrdom incitement” in contem-
porary Palestinian society, authored by Dr. Daphne Burdman.276  Burdman
documented a pervasive “indoctrination to martyrdom” campaign in the
years 1993– 2003, targeting children through the Palestinian Authority’s
school textbooks, teachers’ guides, militarized summer camps, and televi-
sion programming.277  The study revealed extensive, dehumanizing charac-
terizations of Israelis and Jews in Palestinian schools and media, alongside
glorification of suicide bombers and calls to jihad.278
Many young Palestinians responded to the campaign, with fatal conse-
quences.  Over a twenty-five-day period in 2000, 207 Palestinian deaths
were attributed to “insurgency” actions taken against Israeli forces (rock-
throwing, etc.).  Ninety-five deaths, or forty-six percent were of children
below age eighteen.  Of 350 insurgents’ deaths from a three-month period
in the same year, thirty percent were under eighteen, and almost twenty-
five percent were under age twelve.279  For the twelve-month period ending
August 31, 2001, Israel was able to identify the ages of fifty-one Palestinian
suicide bombers: “most . . . were between . . . eighteen to twenty-four,” that
is, very young adults.280  Large numbers of Palestinian children acted as
stone-throwers against Israelis and as human shields for older gunmen.281
Burdman cited a Palestinian psychologist’s study of very young children,
ages six to eleven, finding that “over [fifty] percent dream of becoming sui-
cide bombers wearing explosive belts.”282  Burdman concluded, “[m]ass
indoctrination of children and young adults . . . emanating from media,
schools, pulpit, and street has been eminently successful in helping to gen-
erate [an] abundance of suicide bombers . . . .”283
Another study, which focused on anti-Semitic beliefs in Germany,
compared different birth cohorts sorted by decade; it revealed a significant,
274. Id. at 259.
275. Id. at 260.
276. Daphne Burdman, Education, Indoctrination, and Incitement: Palestinian Children
on Their Way to Martyrdom, 15 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 96, 96 (2003).
277. Id. at 96– 105.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 105.
280. Id. at 106.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 107.
283. Id.
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enduring impact of the Nazis’ mass hate incitement from between seventy
and eighty-five years ago.284  The study used a standardized survey con-
ducted across Germany in 1996 and 2006, which asked a series of seven
questions generating a ranked assessment of anti-Semitic beliefs.  The data
set included responses from 5,300 persons in 264 German cities.285  The
share of individuals holding anti-Semitic beliefs in the 1930s birth cohort—
the generation that would have been five to fifteen years old when the Nazi
regime was defeated— was almost three times that of those born after 1950,
and more than double the percentage of the prior and subsequent birth
cohorts.286  The study concluded that:
Nazi indoctrination— in school, through propaganda, and in youth organiza-
tions— successfully instilled strongly anti-Semitic attitudes in the cohorts
that grew up under the Nazi regime . . . the differential effect is still visible
today, more than half a century after the fall of the Third Reich.287
9. Summary and Conclusions
Taken together, the studies discussed above appear to validate the
belief manifested by genocidal leaders— that hate incitement is an essential
tool for recruiting the large numbers needed to perpetrate mass atrocities.
The experiments are consistent with, and help explain, the historically doc-
umented facts that (1) pervasive hate incitement regularly precedes geno-
cides, (2) genocides are not carried out by a select group of pre-identified
killers, but rather by large numbers of ordinary people who have been
transformed into mass killers, and (3) such transformations can be
effected by forces other than explicit coercion, including messages,
imagery, and power relationships that dehumanize the intended targets.
Specifically, the predispositions of in-group bias and weak altruism
towards strangers, along with Zimbardo’s prison experiment reveal how
easily— even absent significant pressure from authority figures— ordinary,
psychologically healthy people can form an exclusive group identity, disre-
gard the visible suffering of strangers, and inflict painful punishment upon
innocent “others.”  The experiments on conforming to majorities reveal
how quickly rational judgment can be subordinated to contrary peer opin-
ions.  Lerner’s “just world phenomenon” shows how easily people can
rationalize blatantly arbitrary, unfair treatment of strangers as “getting
what they deserve.”  Finally, Milgram’s and Bandura’s punishment experi-
ments demonstrate how little effort is needed for authority figures to per-
suade individuals to inflict excruciating pain on strangers, and how— even
absent prodding from the authorities— dehumanized images of strangers
powerfully increase the willingness to inflict such suffering.  Studies show-
ing the effects of hate indoctrination on children in both the Palestinian
284. See Nico Voigtla¨ndera & Hans-Joachim Voth, Nazi Indoctrination and Anti-Semitic
Beliefs in Germany, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7931, 7931 (2015), www.pnas.org/cgi/
doi/10.1073/pnas.1414822112.
285. Id. at 7931.
286. Id. at 7932.
287. Id. at 7933.
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territories and Nazi Germany lend a chilling note of corroborative reality to
those laboratory findings.
Regarding the transferability of these controlled experimental findings
to an environment of mass genocide incitement, it can be observed that the
latter settings present similar “triggers” as the experiments, but with much
greater force and duration.  As demonstrated by the case studies in Part II,
above, real-world incitement campaigns: (1) impose strongly defined
boundaries between “in-group” and “out-group” members; (2) ratify those
boundaries by extensive state-sanctioned discrimination and exclusion of
the out-groups; (3) are conveyed by a closed, state-controlled media that
propagates dehumanized images of the out-groups; (4) are reinforced by
explicit messages that genocide of the out-groups is no less than what they
deserve; and (5) includes explicit instruction from the heights of the politi-
cal authority structures to join the mass violence, e.g., Nazi citizens’ “duty
to exterminate” the Jewish vermin288, and Hutus’ duty to “cease feeling
pity for the Tutsi” and “prepare[ ] to defend themselves against this
scourge.”289  Unlike the laboratory setting, these real-world triggers are
delivered with far greater intensity than a controlled experiment, are exper-
ienced in combination rather than as one trigger in isolation, and persist
over a period of years, rather than at most a few days.
In sum, the historical and psychological evidence establishes a con-
vincing case that mass hate incitement is a substantial cause of genocide.
This is especially true in light of the large numbers of perpetrators needed
to effectuate such mass killing.  Without the incitement, the number of
willing perpetrators would likely be much smaller, and the ability of a
regime to perpetrate genocide would correspondingly be much lower.
Accordingly, policies that can effect reductions in hate incitement would
appear to be among the more useful components of an effective genocide
prevention strategy.
IV. Proposed Legislation and Example of its Application
As previously noted, this Article purports to fashion a politically feasi-
ble policy capable of reducing the likelihood of future genocides, and pro-
poses to that end, federal legislation to condition American military and
economic benefits and bilateral trading rights upon each recipient coun-
try’s refraining from funding, facilitating, and encouraging incitement to
genocide.  Accordingly, this Part first presents the core components of a
legislative proposal, then discusses its potential applicability to the govern-
ment of Iran, which is presently one of the world’s leading state sponsors
of genocide incitement.
288. ARONSFELD, supra note 77, at 14, 17.
289. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, paras.
138– 39 (Dec. 3, 2003), http://www.refworld.org/docid/404468bc2.html; MELVERN,
supra note 30, at 50.
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A. The Proposed Legislation
A useful model for the proposed legislation is the so-called Jackson-
Vanik amendment, adopted in 1974 and, until its December 2012 repeal,
codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2432.290  Enacted as part of the Trade Act of 1974,
the amendment targeted nonmarket economy countries, and conditioned
such countries’ receipt of certain U.S. trade benefits on their allowing free
emigration of their citizens.  The conditional trade benefits included: (1)
granting “most-favored-nation” tariff status for exports to the United
States; (2) access to “U.S. government financial facilities,” e.g., export cred-
its and credit guarantees; and (3) opportunities to enter trade agreements
with the United States.291  The principal aim of the amendment’s sponsors,
Sen. Henry Jackson and Rep. Charles Vanik, was to pressure the Soviet
Union to loosen its strict and punitive policies that prevented Soviet citi-
zens, primarily Soviet Jews, seeking to emigrate.292
The Jackson-Vanik amendment contained four components that, in
modified form, would comprise the core of the proposed law: (1) a policy
condition required of the covered countries (free emigration); (2) sanctions
for failure to meet the condition (denial of specified U.S. trade benefits);
(3) a requirement of annual Presidential reports to Congress, certifying
whether each country satisfies the policy condition; and (4) Presidential
authority to waive sanctions on non-compliant countries, upon a Presiden-
tial finding that waiver nonetheless will advance the law’s objectives, sub-
ject to override by joint Congressional resolution.
In this case, the desired policy condition is refraining from funding,
facilitating, or otherwise encouraging genocide incitement, as defined in
Part I, above.  The proposed sanctions include the denial of all U.S. eco-
nomic and military assistance and benefits, and all bilateral trading rights.
Barring the latter could be accomplished by cross-referencing in the pro-
posed statute, the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. Appx.
§§ 1, et seq., which imposes trade embargos on designated countries.
Because the law’s execution would require annual, labor-intensive
assessments of whether any country or equivalent state actor is sponsoring
genocide incitement, a sufficiently staffed and funded entity is needed to
conduct such research.  In fact, such an entity already exists, although the
annual assessments would likely require more staffing.  That entity is the
interagency Atrocities Prevention Board, established by an August 2011
Presidential Directive, and tasked with the missions of ensuring:
(1) [T]hat our national security apparatus recognizes and is responsive to
early indicators of potential atrocities; (2) that departments and agencies
develop and implement comprehensive atrocity prevention and response
strategies in a manner that allows “red flags” and dissent to be raised to
290. Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary on H.R. 6156,
WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/14/statement-
press-secretary-hr-6156.
291. VLADIMIR N. PREGELJ, CONG. RES. SERV., THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT: A SURVEY
2– 3 (2005).
292. Id. at 1.
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decision makers; [and] (3) that we increase the capacity and develop doc-
trine for our foreign service, armed services, development professionals, and
other actors to engage in the full spectrum of smart [atrocities] prevention
activities . . . .293
Finally, to mitigate the privations that sanctions may impose on inno-
cent civilians, the law should incorporate a carve-out for humanitarian
assistance and communications, similar to those in the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701– 1702 et seq.
The following proposal incorporates the several foregoing considera-
tions, drawing heavily from the Jackson-Vanik amendment and IEEPA:
Sanctions Against State-Sponsored Genocide Incitement
(a) Findings and purpose.
Finding that genocide incitement as defined herein has been and
remains a substantial cause of genocide, and finding that prevention of
genocide implicates important humanitarian and national security inter-
ests of the United States, Congress hereby imposes the following condi-
tional sanctions against all state sponsors of genocide incitement.
(b) Conditional sanctions.
Any country or equivalent state actor that funds, facilitates, or otherwise
encourages incitement to genocide as defined herein shall: (i) be barred
from participation in any and all U.S. government programs that involve
international economic or military assistance or that provide interna-
tional economic or military benefits; and (ii) be designated as a country
subject to the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.
Appx. §§ 1 et seq.  These sanctions shall become effective after the Presi-
dential reporting deadline in section (c).  All such sanctions against a
country or equivalent state actor shall be lifted as of the date on which
the President conveys to Congress a Presidential determination that
such country or equivalent state actor is no longer funding, facilitating,
or otherwise encouraging incitement to genocide as defined herein.
(c) Presidential determination and report to Congress whether countries or
equivalent state actors are funding, facilitating, or otherwise encourag-
ing incitement to genocide.
On or before December 31 of each year, the President shall submit a
report to Congress that: (i) certifies which, if any, countries or
equivalent state actors are engaged in funding, facilitating, or otherwise
encouraging incitement to genocide as defined herein; and (ii) certifies
with respect to all other countries or equivalent state actors that such
country or equivalent state actor has been assessed during the year in
question and found to be not engaged in such prohibited acts of geno-
cide incitement.  The conditional sanctions described in section (b),
above, shall be imposed and applied with respect to all countries or
equivalent state actors identified in the President’s annual report as
engaged in prohibited acts of genocide incitement.
(d) Monitoring and assessment to assist Presidential determinations.
To assist in the President’s assessment and reporting obligations under
subsection (c), above, the interagency Atrocities Prevention Board
293. Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities,
WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/04/presidential-
study-directive-mass-atrocities.
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(“APB”) shall monitor and assess all countries and equivalent state
actors for evidence of genocide incitement, as defined herein, and Con-
gress shall appropriate funds sufficient to staff the APB to conduct such
monitoring and assessment.
(e) Presidential waiver authority; Congressional override.
(1) For some or all of the year following the December 31 reporting
deadline, the President is authorized to waive, by Executive order, the
application of subsections (b) and (c) with respect to any country or
equivalent state actor deemed under section (c)(1) to be subject to sanc-
tions, upon the President’s reporting to the Congress that:
(i) The President has determined that such waiver will substantially
promote the objectives of this statute; and
(ii) The President has received assurances that the country or
equivalent state actor in question is taking steps that will lead substan-
tially to the achievement of the objectives of this statute.
(2) Any Presidential waiver, and any Presidential finding that a country
or equivalent state actor is no longer funding, facilitating, or otherwise
encouraging incitement to genocide, shall be subject to override upon
Congress’s enacting a joint resolution, in which Congress finds that:
(i)  The country or equivalent state actor in question is funding,
facilitating, or otherwise encouraging incitement to genocide as
defined herein;
(ii) The country or equivalent state actor in question is not taking
steps sufficient to lead substantially to the achievement of the objec-
tives of this statute; and
(iii) A waiver of the application of subsections (b) and (c) will not
substantially promote the objectives of this statute.
Any such override shall be subject to Presidential veto; and any
such veto shall be subject to Congressional override by a two-thirds
majority vote of both houses of Congress.
(f) Humanitarian exceptions; applicable except where U.S. armed forces in
danger.
Any sanctions imposed under this statute shall not include the regula-
tion or prohibition, directly or indirectly, of:
(1) Any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communica-
tion, which does not involve a transfer of anything of value; and
(2) Donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, of articles such as food, clothing, and medicine, intended to
be used to relieve human suffering, except to the extent that the Pres-
ident determines that such donations would endanger Armed Forces
of the United States which are engaged in hostilities or are in a situa-
tion where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances.
The statute would also have a definitions section, which would incor-
porate the definitions of genocide and genocide incitement set forth in sec-
tions I.A and I.B, above.
It could be argued that the Presidential waiver authority in the pro-
posed statute is too narrow, in a sense that threats to national security
outside the genocide context also may require waivers.  In particular,
America’s counter-terrorism policies since the September 11, 2001 attacks
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have included military and other cooperation with regimes that might
qualify for anti-incitement sanctions under the statute.  But granting waiv-
ers for such regimes risks eviscerating the statute’s operation in the very
places where it is most needed.
Moreover, the same state-sponsored incitement that promotes geno-
cide also very likely promotes terrorism, for reasons discussed in Part III,
above.294  While a thorough assessment of that claim is beyond the scope
of this Article, it serves as a reminder that anti-incitement sanctions and
counter-terrorism policies probably share some common ground, where
the sanctions reinforce rather than conflict with counter-terrorism objec-
tives.  An issue for future consideration, therefore, is whether a national
security waiver could be narrowly tailored to accommodate counter-terror-
ism initiatives, while leaving intact an effective sanctions policy against
state-sponsored genocide incitement.
B. Potential Application of the Law: Sanctions Against Iran
A strong case can be made, and has been made by genocide scholars,
that the present Iranian regime’s public diplomacy, along with its support
of genocidal terror groups and pursuit of nuclear weapons, furnishes con-
clusive evidence of genocide incitement as defined by the UN Genocide
Convention.295  As discussed below, the regime’s conduct also falls within
the genocide incitement definition from section I.B, above, specifically: (1)
communications; (2) conveyed to a large number of individuals; (3)
intending to promote genocide . . . ; (4) as evidenced primarily by (a) text
endorsing hatred and/or violence towards one or more groups and (b) in a
context wherein such communications would likely lead to violence
against the targeted group(s).
By itself, the cumulative text of the Iranian regime’s public rhetoric
likely satisfies the latter definition, viz., (1) communications (2) conveyed
to a large number of individuals (3) intending to promote genocide.  Elihu
Richter’s and Alex Barnea’s 2009 study of the regime’s rhetoric docu-
mented more than twenty declarations from top political and clerical lead-
294. See also, e.g., ALAN BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO THE CHANGING FORMS OF INCITEMENT
TO TERROR AND VIOLENCE: THE NEED FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 5 (Alan Baker
ed., 2012) (“Perhaps the most neglected, yet the most central component of international
terror is the element of incitement.  Incitement is the medium through which the ideol-
ogy of terror actually materializes into the act of terror itself.  Without circulation of the
ideology and the recruitment of support as a result of incitement, there would be no act
of terror.”).
295. See, e.g., Gregory S. Gordon, From Incitement to Indictment? Prosecuting Iran’s
President for Advocating Israel’s Destruction and Piecing Together Incitement Law’s Emerg-
ing Analytical Framework, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 853, 857 (2008); Elihu D.
Richter & Alex Barnea, Tehran’s Genocidal Incitement Against Israel, MIDDLE E.Q. 45, 45
(2009), http://www.meforum.org/2167/iran-genocidal-incitement-israel; Irwin Cotler,
State-Sanctioned Incitement to Genocide in Ahmadinejad’s Iran: The Responsibility to Pre-
vent, GENOCIDE PREVENTION NOW, Winter 2010, http://www.genocidepreventionnow.org
/Home/GPNISSUES/Issue1Winter2010/tabid/72/ctl/DisplayArticle/mid/525/aid/49/
Default.aspx (“Today, the epicentre of state-sanctioned incitement to genocide is Presi-
dent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Iran.”).
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ers in the prior five years, all endorsing the destruction of the state of
Israel.  Some representative examples convey the genocidal intent:
October 2005: “We will be satisfied with nothing less than the complete
obliteration of the Zionist regime from the political map of the world.”
October 2006: “The nation of Muslims must prepare for the great war, so as
to completely wipe out the Zionist dream, and remove this cancerous
growth.”
December 2006: “[T]he Zionist regime will be wiped out, and humanity will
be liberated.”
October 2007: “Death to America and death to Israel . . . reflects the desire
of all the Muslim nations.”
February 2008: “In the near future, we will witness the destruction of the
cancerous microbe Israel by the strong and capable hands of . . . [Iran-sup-
ported terror group] Hezbollah.”
February 2008: “[W]ith God’s help, the time has come for the Zionist’s
regime death sentence.”
July 2008: “Thanks to God, your wish will soon be realized, and this germ of
corruption will be wiped off the face of the world.”296
For the year 2013 alone, the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs docu-
mented twenty similar, public threats to destroy Israel issued by the Ira-
nian government.297  Iran’s leaders also sponsor mass rallies in its largest
cities every year, at which hundreds of thousands shout, “Death to Israel”
and “Death to America!”298— clearly satisfying the elements of genocidal
(1) communications; (2) conveyed to a large number of individuals.
Beyond its direct genocidal threats, the Iranian regime regularly
mimics the Nazi, Serb, and Hutu genocidaires by promoting “dehumaniza-
tion of Israelis and Jews through the use of epidemiological metaphors.”
Examples include: “filthy germ”; “savage beast”; “cancerous tumour”;
“stinking corpse”; “unclean regime”; “cancerous bacterium”; and a “cess-
pool created by itself and its supporters.”299  The regime also demonizes its
genocidal targets as, e.g., “the true manifestation of Satan”; “bloodthirsty
barbarians” having “no boundaries, limits, or taboos when it comes to kill-
ing human beings”; perpetrators of a “war against humanity”; and “a small
but deceitful number of people called Zionists . . . dominating . . . the
financial and monetary centers [and] . . . political decision-making
centers . . . .”300
296. ELIHU D. RICHTER & ALEX BARNEA, supra note 295, at tbl. 1.
297. Daniel Rubenstein, Sworn to Destruction: What Iranian Leaders Continue to Say
About Israel in the Rouhani Era, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. (Jan. 7, 2014), http://
jcpa.org/article/20-threats-iranian-leaders-made-in-2013/.
298. See, e.g., Majid Rafizadeh, Iran still shouts ‘death to America and Israel,’ AL
ARABIYA NEWS (Nov. 8, 2013), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/
2013/11/08/Death-to-America-and-Israel-Iran-s-day-against-global-arrogance.html;
Reuters, Iranians push for Palestinian resistance at Jerusalem Day rally in Tehran, JERUSA-
LEM POST (July 25, 2014), http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Iranians-push-
for-Palestinian-resistance-at-Jerusalem-Day-rally-in-Tehran-368918.
299. COTLER, supra note 295 (emphasis added).
300. Id.
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Further evidencing genocide incitement is the context of Iran’s public
diplomacy, in which Iran has taken steps to guarantee that its genocidal
communications not only are likely to cause violence against the targeted
group, but actually are capable of doing so.  From the early 1980s, Iran
created, recruited, financed, and trained the terrorist group Hizbollah in
south Lebanon, whose founding manifesto calls for destroying Israel.
Hizbollah has kidnapped Israeli soldiers, launched missiles into Israel, and
presently controls an estimated one hundred thousand Iran-supplied rock-
ets targeting Israel.301  Iran also has supported and supplied the terrorist
group Hamas in the Gaza Strip, whose covenant similarly calls for destroy-
ing Israel, and which has fired over eleven thousand rockets into southern
Israel from 2005 through 2014.302  Having also established a Hizbollah
force inside Syria, Iran has now surrounded Israel with genocidal forces on
its northeast, north, and southwest borders.303
Lest any doubt remain, the Iranian regime’s well-documented pursuit
of nuclear weapons, along with its boast that “the use of even one nuclear
bomb inside Israel will destroy everything.  However, it will only harm the
Islamic world,” conclusively demonstrates its genocidal intent.304  How-
ever, the foregoing facts make clear that, even absent Iran’s quest for
nuclear weapons, the case for sanctioning its incitement would remain
most compelling.
V. Policy Assessment: Weighing the Costs and Benefits
While one can imagine several objections to the proposed legislation,
among the more salient are those derived from the general critiques of
sanctions policies.  These include: (1) sanctions do not work; (2) sanctions
harm the wrong people; and (3) mandatory sanctions overly constrain the
conduct of foreign policy.  This Part seeks to address the primary consider-
ations relevant to each objection.
301. KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE PERSIAN PUZZLE: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND
AMERICA 200– 01 (2004) (Iran’s creation, financing, and training of Hizbollah); Adam
Entous, Charles Levinson & Julian E. Barnes, Hezbollah Upgrades Missile Threat to Israel,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 2, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/com/articles/SB1000142405
270230436160457929061392054238; An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL. PRIMARY SOURCES (Jan. 1, 1988), http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organiza
tions-and-networks/open-letter-hizballah-program/p30967; Hezbollah seizes Israel
soldiers, BBC (July 12, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5171616.stm.
302. Hamas Covenant 1988, Aug. 18, 1998, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/
hamas.asp; Elad Benari & AFP, Iran: We Provided Hamas with Rocket Technology, ISR.
NAT’L NEWS (July 25, 2014), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/
183332#!; Rocket Attacks on Israel From Gaza, ISR. DEF. FORCES BLOG, http://
www.idfblog.com/facts-figures/rocket-attacks-toward-israel/ (last visited Sept. 15,
2016).
303. Michael Segall & Shimon Shapira, Iran Launches “Hizbullah Syria” to Open a
New Front Against Israel on the Golan Heights, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. (June 2,
2014), http://jcpa.org/article/iran-hizbullah-syria-front/.
304. See Noah Beck, A nuclear Middle East is doomsday, COMMENTATOR (May 28,
2013), http://www.thecommentator.com/article/3633/a_nuclear_middle_east_is_
doomsday.
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A. First Objection: Sanctions Do Not Work
With economic sanctions “increasingly being used to promote . . .
American foreign policy objectives,” some policy scholars contend that
they are “rarely effective,” at least when imposed unilaterally, and criticize
sanctions as “blunt instruments that often produce unintended and unde-
sirable consequences.”305
Empirical data paint a much less bleak picture.  In what appears to be
the most comprehensive assessment of the subject yet attempted, research-
ers examined 204 instances of economic sanctions imposed by nation-
states in the twentieth century, and “found sanctions to be at least partially
successful in [thirty-four] percent of the cases that we documented.”306
The success rate varied with the sanctions’ desired behavior change: a
twenty-one percent success rate in disrupting military adventures; thirty-
one percent each in “military impairment” and in regime change and
democratization; fifty-one percent in “modest” policy changes; and thirty
percent in “other” major policy changes.307  Insofar as the desired behavior
change here does not involve “disrupting military adventures,” the perti-
nent comparison categories manifest a success rate of between approxi-
mately one-third to one-half.308  In sum, “the bald statement ‘sanctions
never work’ is demonstrably wrong.”309
A one-third to one-half success rate of international sanctions may
seem underwhelming, but this invites the following question: compared to
what else?  Two comparison contexts come readily to mind: (1) other geno-
cide prevention strategies; and (2) other categories of public policy alto-
gether.  Both contexts shine a comparatively favorable light on the
sanctions option.
With respect to other genocide prevention strategies, the record is far
from encouraging.  As noted at the start of this Article, Professor Barbara
Harff has documented a total of thirty-seven genocide episodes from 1955
to 2001— an average of almost one new genocide per year, which no nation
or coalition found the wherewithal to prevent.310  Professor Samantha
Power has thoroughly documented the United States and its allies’ failures
to respond effectively to the late-twentieth-century genocides in Cambodia,
Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda, Srebenica, and Kosovo, concluding:
305. See Richard N. Haass, Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing, BROOKINGS
(July 1998), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/1998/06/sanctions-haass; see
also Robert P. O’Quinn, A User’s Guide to Economic Sanctions, HERITAGE FOUND. BACK-
GROUNDER, June 25, 1997, at 1– 2, 6, thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/1997/pdf/bg11
26.pdf.
306. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 158– 59 (3d
ed. 2009).
307. Id. at 159.
308. The study also found that multilateral sanctions may be less effective than uni-
lateral sanctions, particularly if reaching consensus on multilateral sanctions requires
dilution of the sanctions’ forcefulness. Id. at 172– 75.
309. Id. at 159.
310. See HARFF, supra note 4, at 59– 60.
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[T]he United States has consistently refused to take risks in order to sup-
press genocide . . . .  The states bordering genocidal societies and the Euro-
pean powers have looked away as well.  Despite broad public concerns that
genocide should “never again” be allowed . . . the last decade of the twentieth
century was one of the most deadly in the grimmest century on record.311
For the most part, therefore, the only other existing genocide prevention
strategy is verbal condemnation.  Proactive intervention is very rare, and
even then— as in the case of the Bosnian Muslims— it happens long after the
genocide has commenced and largely run its course.  By comparison, an
actual reduction of occurrence of genocide by one-third to one-half, while
still insufficient, would be a tremendous improvement beyond the status
quo.
That estimated success rate also fares well when compared with the
other major public policy context, namely, domestic policy.  In 2012, Yale
Law School Professor Peter Shuck led a meta-analysis of domestic United
States government program assessments.  As he explained:
[We] canvassed all of the assessments published since 2000 by the Govern-
ment Accountability Office, the Office of Management and Budget, the
center-left Brookings Institution, the center-right American Enterprise Insti-
tute, and two conservative think tanks . . . .  The results were stunning.  We
found more than 270 such assessments . . . .  Only a small number of these
assessments could be considered positive; the vast majority were either
clearly negative or showed mixed results.312
In sum, reducing the incidence of genocide by one-third to one-half would
exceed the success rate not only of existing genocide prevention efforts,
but also that of many domestic policy programs, and likely at a lower cost
than many such initiatives.313
In weighing the significance of that success rate, it is important to take
full account of what is prevented when sanctions have their desired effect.
When the genocide stops, the destructive consequences rarely end.  Like
the mythical genie let out of the bottle, genocidal regimes often trigger a
cascade of secondary, destructive effects, resulting in further geopolitical
destabilization.  The secondary effects can include counter-killings by vic-
tim groups, power struggles amidst impaired national sovereignties, and
waves of terrorism encouraged by the incitement and facilitated by the dis-
order.  Although a thorough discussion of this topic lies beyond the scope
311. POWER, supra note 3, at 503.
312. PETER H. SHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN: AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER
23 (2014).
313. This “success rate” analysis has further layers.  One is the distinction between
success in thwarting incitement versus success in preventing genocide.  Quite possibly,
success in the former would not correlate one hundred percent with success in the lat-
ter.  On the other hand, once the President has made a commitment to impose sanc-
tions, the incipient genocide will be more visibly situated in both the public debate and
the government’s foreign policy agenda, which raises the likelihood of further preventive
action being taken.  This “visibility/action” effect may be among the more salutary by-
products of the proposed legislation, given the United States’ historical reluctance to
intervene while genocides are happening, as noted above. See supra text accompanying
notes 306– 12.
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of this Article, a textbook case of such a “genocide event cascade” is the
long war of the Congo, which followed the 1994 Rwanda genocide.
Around the Congo in south-central Africa, an almost constant state of
war since 1996 has claimed the lives of over five million people.314  One of
the war’s leading historians, Jason Stearns, characterized the 1994 Rwanda
genocide as “the trigger” for the instability and bloodshed that followed.315
As described in Section II.C.1 above, Rwanda’s 1994 genocide of the Tutsi
stopped only when a Tutsi refugee army re-conquered the country.  Over a
million Hutu then fled into neighboring Congo, from which they launched
attacks against Rwanda, tacitly approved by the Congolese regime.  In
1996, the Rwandan Tutsi leadership responded by leading a multinational
invasion to install a new Congolese regime, but that regime later switched
sides to support the refugee Hutu militias.  Then and since, a plethora of
mutually hostile militias have ravaged the Congo with genocide-like mas-
sacres, mass rapes, and revenge killings.316
One can only speculate what might have happened in Rwanda if
robust pressures had been brought to bear against the Hutus’ genocidal
1990– 1994 incitement campaign.  It is at least possible that such pressures
could have tipped the balance away from genocide and towards a success-
ful implementation of the Arusha Peace Accords.317  Moreover, absent the
genocide, it is likely that the mass displacements that gave rise to the hor-
rific Congo war would not have happened, and that millions of Congolese
killed in the war would still be alive today.
B. Second Objection: Sanctions Harm the Wrong People
Some critics maintain that comprehensive sanctions inflict so much
harm on the target country’s citizens as to preclude their use as legitimate
tools of foreign policy.318  Others reply that such critiques “do not take
sufficiently into account” the positive effects of humanitarian assistance
exceptions, by which “the negative impact of sanctions on the civilian pop-
ulation could be mitigated at least to some extent.”319  The sanctions legis-
lation proposed in this Article includes a humanitarian assistance
exception.
314. JASON K. STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF MONSTERS: THE COLLAPSE OF THE
CONGO AND THE GREAT WAR OF AFRICA 4 (2011).
315. Id. at 8.
316. See generally STEARNS, supra note 314.
317. One significant point of leverage would have been the $216 million in loans to
the Hutu regime approved by the World Bank in 1990, of which $112 million was later
found to have been diverted for weapons purchases.  The United States was a major
contributor to those loans. MELVERN, supra note 30, at 57.  Shutting down those loans
and the resulting arms purchases, while pressuring the regime to end its incitement,
would have landed a double blow against the regime’s ability to carry out genocide.
318. See, e.g., Hans-Peter Gasser, International Review of the Red Cross, INT’L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS (June 30, 1998), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/
57jpcs.htm.  Some critics of comprehensive sanctions endorse only partial, or so-called
“smart,” sanctions. Id.
319. Id.
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Nonetheless, the reality of harm to innocent civilians is a fact that
must be acknowledged.  Logically, for sanctions to succeed in changing
policy, their impact must be sufficient to alter a regime’s risk-benefit
calculus— i.e., capable of inflicting hardships.  Also, insofar as sanctions
often target non-democratic countries, the targeted regime is likely to be
one that can shift at least part of the sanctions’ impact onto those who have
no power or influence, while mitigating the impacts upon the leadership
class, its allies among the military, and critical economic sectors.
At the same time, the purpose and anticipated effect of the sanctions
recommended here make for a very atypical balancing of relative harms.
Namely, the balance here is between harms to innocent civilians caused by
imposing sanctions and harms to innocent civilians caused by the possible
failure to prevent an imminent genocide.  In other words, the relative harms
are moderate to significant privation endured by a substantial share of a
nation’s people, versus the possibly avoidable tortures and deaths of a very
large number of people— at least tens of thousands and possibly many
more.320
Yet even that phrasing misses an important consideration that tips the
balance more favorably towards sanctions, at least in an intra-national
genocide risk environment.  In that setting, where a state actor threatens
genocide against an indigenous population, the category of people
adversely affected by the sanctions are in the same category of people from
which would be drawn most of the perpetrators and victims of the geno-
cide sought to be avoided.  As to both potential perpetrators and victims,
this effectively cancels out the comparative harms caused by sanctions.
Specifically, for potential perpetrators, the lesser harm involves endurance
of the hardships of sanctions, rather than inaction that raises the likelihood
that they will become mass murderers.  For potential victims, the lesser
harm is also the hardships of sanctions, rather than likely torture and
death in the event of genocide.
This reasoning is less applicable in a transnational genocide risk envi-
ronment, where a state actor threatens genocide against another state’s
population.  Nonetheless this scenario carries a high risk of unleashing
protracted, post-genocide violence, to include retaliatory violence against
citizens of the perpetrator nation and its regional proxies.  Such violence
was a widespread, albeit underreported, occurrence in post-World War II
Europe.321  Eliminating the future risk of retaliatory violence would offset
320. Because the best estimate of the sanctions’ likely success rate is one-third to one-
half, see supra Section V.A, the effort to quantify the relative harms would need to dis-
count the avoidable harms of genocide by a factor of between one-half to two-thirds,
before comparing them against the harms imposed by sanctions.  On the other hand,
before applying that “success rate discount,” the initial quantification of genocidal
harms also should include the collateral harms of a possible “genocide event cascade,”
as discussed in Section V.A.
321. See generally KEITH LOWE, SAVAGE CONTINENT: EUROPE IN THE AFTERMATH OF
WORLD WAR II (2013).  “[V]engence and retribution washed over every sphere of Euro-
pean life. . . .  German civilians all over Europe were beaten, arrested, used as slave
labour or simply murdered.” Id. at xv.
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the harms of sanctions in a manner similar to the balance of harms assess-
ment applicable to intra-national genocide risks.
A more empirical assessment of those comparative harms does not
appear to be available at this time.  However, there is at least one historical
example of sanctions triggering substantial short-term harms to their
intended beneficiaries, where the latter subsequently expressed their own
opinions about the balance of harms— and they resoundingly favored
sanctions.
As discussed in section IV.A, above, the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amend-
ment imposed trade sanctions intended to pressure the Soviet Union to
loosen its strict, punitive policies preventing Soviet Jews from emigrating.
In the years immediately after its enactment, the Soviets retaliated by fur-
ther restricting Jewish emigration and ramping up prosecutions and
imprisonment of Jews who sought to teach their religion and culture
(which the Soviets had effectively banned) and for speaking out against
human rights abuses.322
Then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger vehemently opposed the Jack-
son-Vanik amendment as an obstacle to U.S.– Soviet cooperation, insisting
that such cooperation would better assist Soviet Jews.323  But despite the
Soviets’ draconian suppression of Jewish “refuseniks”324 after the law’s
passage, the refusenik leaders who bore the brunt of the retribution
strongly supported the amendment, as the then-jailed Natan Sharansky
made clear:
When the gates closed on Soviet Jewry (from 35,000 [emigrants] in
1973, . . . to just a few thousand in the years that followed), Kissinger
pointed to it as proof that Jackson’s confrontational approach was ill-
advised . . . .  But those of us in whose name Kissinger was criticizing Jack-
son saw things differently.  We refuseniks knew that the Soviets had no
intention of allowing masses of Jews to leave, and we saw the amendment as
putting our plight on the international agenda . . . .  [W]ith pressure building
from the West, we were convinced that the regime could not act toward us
with impunity . . . .325
Similarly, amidst the later Soviet reforms under Mikhail Gorbachev,
which included some loosening of emigration and cultural restrictions on
Jews, a delegation of American Jewish leaders convinced the Soviets to per-
mit further emigration and freedom for Soviet Jews, in exchange for repeal
of the Jackson-Vanik sanctions.  Again the refusniks, who bore the brunt of
retribution for the sanctions, strongly opposed the proposed deal.326
322. GAL BECKERMAN, WHEN THEY COME FOR US, WE’LL BE GONE: THE EPIC STRUGGLE
TO SAVE SOVIET JEWRY 373– 446 (2010).
323. Id. at 288.
324. “Refuseniks” refers to the large number of Soviet Jews who applied for permis-
sion to emigrate, had their applications refused, then were fired from their jobs and
thrust into a desperate, years-long struggle to survive. BECKERMAN, supra note 322,
at 245.
325. NATAN SHARANSKY & RON DERMER, THE CASE FOR DEMOCRACY: THE POWER OF FREE-
DOM TO OVERCOME TYRANNY & TERROR 119– 20 (2004).
326. BECKERMAN, supra note 322, at 513– 15.
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Although the suffering experienced by the refuseniks cannot guaran-
tee the accuracy of  their assessment of the sanctions’ effectiveness, their
continued support of sanctions through years of oppression does confer a
certain credibility and moral stature to their perspective.327  Along with the
other considerations discussed here, it further undermines the claim that
the hardships imposed by sanctions outweigh their potential benefits.
C. Third Objection: Mandatory Sanctions Overly Constrain the
Conduct of Foreign Policy
Lastly, some oppose sanctions because they believe such sanctions
overly constrain the executive branch’s conduct of an effective foreign pol-
icy.  Automatic, mandatory sanctions are especially disfavored:
[U]ltimately only the President can weigh all the foreign policy issues at
stake . . . and tailor our response to a specific situation . . . .  [L]egislation
that empowers the President to impose economic sanctions should also
empower him not to act and to waive or suspend measures already in place if
it is in the national interest.328
The legislation proposed in this Article does include a Presidential
waiver provision, but one that is more limited than the above recommenda-
tion in two critical ways: (1) the proposed waiver cannot be invoked on
broad grounds of “national interest,” but only where the waiver is deemed
to “substantially promote the objectives” of the anti-incitement sanctions
statute; and (2) the President’s waiver authority is not unilateral, but rather
may be subject to override by joint Congressional resolution.329
As discussed in Section IV.A, above, there is an open question whether
the statute also should authorize waivers to facilitate trans-national cooper-
ation in counter-terrorism operations; the challenge then being, to fashion
such authority in a manner that does not eviscerate the statute’s effective-
ness in confronting genocide incitement.  Apart from that question— which
could be addressed by adding counter-terrorism waiver authority— there is
a strong argument that incitement sanctions will not overly constrain the
executive’s conduct of foreign policy.  Addressing that concern requires an
assessment of the particular circumstances where incitement sanctions are
likely to be imposed over Presidential opposition, and a further assessment
of the net harms, if any, resulting from such conflicts between Congress
and the President.
327. The supporters of sanctions received a measure of vindication when, three years
after the American Jewish delegation unsuccessfully urged repeal of Jackson-Vanik, the
Soviets reversed their policies, resulting in the eventual emigration of over 1.7 million
Jews. Id. at 528.
328. Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricul-
tural Affairs, Testimony Before the Lott Bipartisan Senate Task Force on Sanctions (Sept.
8, 1998), http://www.state.gov/1997-2001-NOPDFS/issues/economic/econ_sanctions.
html.
329. Similarly, the proposed statute authorizes the President to veto a Congressional
override, but the veto can be set aside by a two-thirds majority vote of both houses of
Congress. See discussion supra Section IV.A.
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Perhaps most importantly, such conflicts would have no direct effect
on relations with America’s primary, democratic allies because those
nations do not engage in state-sponsored genocide incitement and hence,
they are not potential targets of the sanctions in question.  “[R]egimes with
strong tendencies to practice eliminationist politics” generally are
“nondemocratic regimes,” because democratic polities lack “the ready insti-
tutional and cultural means to initiate domestic slaughters or elimina-
tions.”330  In a comprehensive statistical analysis of twentieth-century
genocides, Professor Barbara Harff of the U.S. Naval Academy concluded
that “[d]emocratic and quasi-democratic regimes have institutional checks
on executive power that constrain elites from carrying out deadly attacks
on citizens . . . .  Full democracies . . . have virtually no risk of geno-/
politicide.”331
Also relevant to this analysis is the fact that “[t]he countries perpetrat-
ing mass murder and eliminationist politics, or tempted to do so, are over-
whelmingly poor and weak . . . .”332  Accordingly political battles over the
imposition of anti-incitement sanctions will not generally involve major
U.S. trading partners.  There is, however, one notable exception to that con-
clusion, namely, the oil-rich countries of the Middle East: many such coun-
tries beyond Iran promote virulent anti-Semitic propaganda in their state-
controlled media.333  Accordingly, the major Middle Eastern oil exporters
would likely implicate the most difficult and contentious foreign policy
debates over the application of anti-incitement sanctions.
Two considerations would at least partially mitigate those difficulties
in the Middle Eastern context.  First, the limited waiver authority of the
proposed statute allows for some selectivity in deciding where to impose
sanctions among multiple regional sponsors of genocide incitement.  As
noted in Section IV.A, above, sanctions may be waived when the President
determines “that such waiver will substantially promote the objectives of
this statute.”334  One conceivable basis for such wavier is the distinction
between more imminent and less imminent threats of genocide, and the
need to assemble coalitions against the more imminent threat.
Returning to the example of section IV.B, above, if Iran presents a
more imminent threat of genocide than any of its neighbors, then the objec-
tives of the statute may best be served by leveraging the influence of neigh-
boring countries in a coalition to check Iran’s genocidal aspirations.
330. GOLDHAGEN, WORSE THAN WAR, supra note 48, at 590-91.
331. Harff, supra note 4, at 63; see also R.J. Rummel, Democracy Power, Genocide, and
Mass Murder, 39 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 25 (1995) (“[T]he best way to account for and
predict [genocide and other mass killings] is by the degree to which a regime is totalitar-
ian along a democratic-totalitarian scale.”).
332. GOLDHAGEN, WORSE THAN WAR, supra note 48, at 558.
333. See generally Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial Documentation Project, MIDDLE E.
MEDIA RES. INST., http://www.thememriblog.org/antisemitism (last visited Sept. 15,
2016).
334. The President must also be in receipt of some assurance that the country receiv-
ing the waiver is “taking steps that will henceforth lead substantially to the achievement
of the objectives of this statute.” See discussion supra Section IV.A.
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Assembling such a coalition may require waiving sanctions with respect to
one or more countries that also engage in some degree of genocide incite-
ment.  By authorizing waivers that “substantially promote the objectives of
th[e] statute,” the proposed law accommodates the choice of working with
“the lesser evil” to wage effective combat against the greater one.335
The second consideration is the changing balance of global energy
supplies.  In sum, technological advances in the extraction of oil and natu-
ral gas are greatly reducing the United States’s dependence on Middle East-
ern oil imports.  According to global energy consultant Daniel Yergin,
“petroleum imports have fallen from their high of [sixty] percent in 2005 to
[thirty-five] percent today,” which is where they stood on the eve of the
1973 Arab oil embargo.336  The chief economist of the International
Energy Agency has predicted that “[b]y around 2020, the United States
[will] become the largest global oil producer . . . .  The result is a continued
fall in [U.S.] oil imports, to the extent that North America becomes a net oil
exporter around 2030.”337
This tectonic shift in the global energy balance means that American
dependence on Middle Eastern oil is steadily receding over time.  Accord-
ingly, the difficulties of integrating anti-incitement legislation into the
broader framework of Middle Eastern foreign policy is growing ever less
problematic.
In sum, while anti-incitement legislation may add an element of com-
plexity to certain foreign policy issues, it presents a far from insuperable
burden.  Such burdens may appear relatively modest when weighed against
the benefits of both reducing the incidence of genocide, and preventing the
murderous geopolitical upheavals that often follow in genocide’s wake.
Conclusion
The case studies, historical assessments, and social psychology experi-
ments recounted in this Article compellingly validate the hypothesis that
persistent, widespread genocide incitement can readily create a large pool
of individuals capable of mass killing.  State sponsors of genocide incite-
ment therefore play a critical role in making genocides possible, both by
popularizing and legitimating genocidal ideologies, and by transforming
such ideologies into engines of mass slaughter.
It logically follows that, in seeking a politically feasible policy capable
of reducing the incidence of genocide, an especially worthy approach is
legislation that imposes comprehensive sanctions against state actors who
promote genocide incitement.  While far from a complete solution, the evi-
335. See generally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF
TERROR (2005).
336. See Daniel Yergin, Congratulations, America. You’re (Almost) Energy Independent.
Now What? POLITICO MAG. (Nov. 2013), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2013
/11/congratulations-america-youre-almost-energy-independent-now-what-98985.html.
337. See Richard Spencer, Fracking Boom Frees the U.S. from Old Oil Alliances, TELE-
GRAPH (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/energy/oil/10476647/Frack
ing-boom-frees-ththie-US-from-old-oil-alliances.html.
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dence indicates that sanctions ordinarily have a success rate of between
one-third to one-half in the pertinent cases studied, a much higher success
rate than other existing genocide prevention efforts, and significantly
higher than many domestic policy initiatives.  Moreover, the preliminary
assessment set forth in this Article strongly suggests that the likely benefits
of genocide sanctions legislation substantially exceed its probable costs
and collateral harms.
Uniquely, the U.S. economy has the depth and breadth to support an
especially robust sanctions policy, and the global influence for sanctions to
make a meaningful difference in at least some genocidal risk environ-
ments.  Given both the sheer magnitude of human suffering involved in
genocide and the destructive geopolitical instability that often follows in its
wake, genocide prevention warrants a high priority on the foreign policy
agenda.  Based on the evidence discussed in this Article, incitement sanc-
tions legislation would be a valuable first step.
